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Abstract
The government’s pensions Green Paper – A new contract for welfare:
partnership in pensions – proposes fundamental changes to the UK’s
retirement income system. Members of CASE and of the Department of
Social Policy at LSE have looked at the likely implications of the reforms
for pensioner poverty, income security in old age, economic growth, the
National Insurance system, tax reliefs, and women. Agulnik’s analysis of
the redistributive effects of the State Second Pension (SSP) shows that it
will result in much better benefits for low earners than would have been
the case under SERPS. However, financing this improved provision
through National Insurance Contributions will mean that the burden of
paying for the new scheme will be heaviest for those close to the upper
earnings limit. Barr questions the macro-economic advantages of
increasing the amount of funded pension provision via Stakeholder
pensions. He finds there is no particular reason to favour the proposed
balance of 60% private pension provision to 40% public provision over
some other ratio. He also finds that Stakeholder pensions will not offer
contributors complete income security in retirement due to uncertainties
about investment returns, annuity rates and future inflation. Falkingham
and Rake argue that the Government’s proposals have failed to
incorporate fully the needs of women. Women will be under-
represented amongst Stakeholder pensioners, and the exclusion of very
low earners and carers with children over 5 from eligibility for the SSP
will adversely affect women. Agulnik then looks at the proposed tax
relief rules for Stakeholder pensions. While there are good reasons for
the proposed £3,600 limit to tax relief on contributions, the retention of
the existing rules for personal and occupational schemes is anomalous.
5The Proposed Second State Pension and National Insurance
Phil Agulnik
The pensions Green Paper (DSS, 1998) proposes substantial changes to
second tier pension provision in the UK. In particular, the government
plans to replace the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS),
introduced barely twenty years ago by the last Labour administration,
with a new State Second Pension (SSP). According to the Green Paper,
this will result in “dramatically better pension provision for those earning less
than £9,000 a year” and, through increased payments to private pension
schemes, will also provide “extra help to those on middle incomes (£9,000 -
£18,500 a year)”.
This paper looks at the rationale behind the Green Paper’s
proposals, calculates the redistributive effects of the SSP, and sets out
some criticisms of the government’s gradualist approach. The paper is
divided into five sections. Section one discusses the objectives for
pension policy set out in the Green Paper, and puts the government’s
strategy into historical context by examining how and why second tier
pension provision developed in the UK. Sections two and three then
look at the detailed operation of SERPS and the SSP, describing the
rather complex administrative procedures involved and showing how
the pension entitlements earned differ under the two schemes. The
analysis shows that, though some ‘lifetime poor’ people will not gain
from the proposals due to the relatively tight eligibility conditions for
the SSP, in general the benefits of the new scheme will be strongly pro-
poor. However, as described in section four, the fact that the SSP will be
financed from National Insurance Contributions (NICs) means that the
burden of paying for the new scheme will be heaviest for people earning
around the upper earnings limit, with very high earners paying
proportionally less.
Section five then concludes, showing how the potential flaws in
the government’s scheme – its complexity, its less than complete
coverage of the lifetime poor (and hence ineffectiveness in eradicating
pensioner poverty), and its somewhat muted redistributive effects –
arise largely from its failure to tackle the ambiguities inherent in
National Insurance.
61 The government’s strategy
The Green Paper’s central objective is to ensure that all pensioners have
an income at or above the poverty line; as the summary states: “Our
package of reforms is aimed squarely at the real problem – ensuring that we all
have security in retirement.” Historically this objective has lain at the heart
of UK pension policy, with the goal of achieving a minimum income
standard being a common thread running through the early
development of the welfare state, from Lloyd-George’s ‘People’s
Budget’, which first established state pensions at the start of the century,
through to the Beveridge-inspired reforms of the post-war years.
However, the emphasis the Green Paper places on achieving a minimum
standard stands in stark contrast to Labour’s ambitions when they were
last in office.
In relation to pensions, the major achievement of the
Wilson/Callaghan governments was the introduction of SERPS, a
scheme which, as its name suggests, is concerned with relating
individuals’ retirement income to their earnings in work. As such,
SERPS is a means for individuals to redistribute resources across their
lifecycle; it does not, by and large, redistribute between members of the
same cohort.1 Consequently, it is of little help in achieving the
government’s minimum retirement income objective; as the Green Paper
puts it: “SERPS, being earnings-related, gives least to those in greatest need”.
Of course, this criticism entirely misses the point of SERPS. The
scheme was not designed with the minimum income objective in mind
but with the separate objective of protecting individuals’ accustomed
living standards. The Green Paper’s real criticism of SERPS is therefore
not that it does not do what it set out to, but that what it set out to do is
not worth doing. While the last Labour government defined ‘poverty’ in
relation to both a universal minimum standard and individuals’
previous earnings, New Labour accepts only the former part of this
definition. Nevertheless, despite this rejection of the earnings-
replacement principle the Green Paper retains a significant role for
second tier pensions. Indeed, the proposals will lead to a major
                                          
1 SERPS does, however, result in significant inter-generational redistribution.
While this is in part simply a function of the way in which pay-as-you go
pension schemes work, a more important reason is that SERPS was designed
to come to maturity over a period of 20 rather than 49 years (as the working
life assumed in the scheme would imply), causing early retirees to gain at the
expense of later generations.
7expansion in this form of provision. How can this be explained? The
answer, possibly, lies in the way UK pension policy has developed over
the last twenty five years.
Pension policy since 1975
When SERPS was introduced it was envisaged that a minimum income
for all pensioners would be ensured through the basic pension. To this
end, the 1974-79 Labour government legislated that the value of the
basic pension, and of other benefits, should increase automatically in
line with the higher of earnings or prices. As the level of the basic
pension and means tested assistance were approximately the same at
that time, this policy offered the prospect that almost all pensioners
would automatically attain the minimum income standard without
means tested assistance.2 Moreover, it also ensured that the minimum
standard kept pace with increases in prosperity among the working
population.3
However, this commitment to increasing benefits in line with
earnings was abandoned in 1980 by the incoming Conservative
government. While not explicitly stated at the time, the new policy was
to uprate all benefits in line with prices. This therefore meant that the
minimum income standard fell relative to average living standards.
Note, therefore, that parsimony was achieved through reducing the
relative value of all benefits rather than through targeting benefits on the
most needy (e.g. via means testing).
In contrast, the new government is clearly committed both to
improving the living standards of the poorest pensioners (those on
Income Support) and to targeting benefits. While the basic pension will
                                          
2 While in theory entitlement to the basic pension depends on an individual’s
labour market history, the existence of a very extensive system of credits
means that almost everyone retiring in the future will receive the maximum
possible payment (Johnson and Stears, 1996). Note though that, even if the
basic pension became fully universal, and was set at the level of the minimum
income standard, the problem of housing costs would mean that some
pensioners would still be reliant on additional assistance from the state. For
the remainder of this paper, however, this caveat is ignored; in effect means
tested assistance is taken to be synonymous with Income Support.
3 In fact, this policy would have gradually increased the relative level of the
minimum standard, as the effect of the ‘higher of earnings or prices’ formula
would have been to ratchet up the value of the minimum during recessions.
See Bradshaw and Lynes (1995) for a full discussion of the effect of alternative
formula for uprating benefits.
8remain tied to prices, the Green Paper states that the “long term aim is
that the new minimum income guarantee [Income Support] should rise in line
with earnings”.4 Over time the effect of this policy will therefore be to
widen the gap between the minimum income and the basic pension,
thus entrenching means testing. This is where the SSP comes in. Because
the new scheme offers much better pension benefits to low earners (see
Section 3) the hope is that, when the scheme matures, widespread
reliance on means tested benefits will be avoided.5 In effect, the idea is to
use the SSP to bridge the gap between the basic pension and the
minimum income standard. However, it is questionable whether the
scheme in its current design will be fully effective in this role; see Rake,
Falkingham and Evans (1999) for a discussion of this issue.
Rationale for the SSP
It is important though to understand why the government wants to
reduce means testing in the future. There are three possible objections to
relying on means tested benefits to secure a minimum retirement income
standard:
1. They are not very effective in relieving pensioner poverty as,
possibly due to social stigma, take-up is less than complete.
2. They may have an adverse effect in terms of horizontal equity;
means testing is ‘unfair’ to people who, having worked and saved
in earlier life, might expect a higher retirement income than more
spendthrift peers.
3. They may affect saving incentives among the working population.
As the Green Paper’s policy for today’s pensioners indicates, the
government are either blasé about the first problem or, more charitably,
are confident that stigma can be reduced and take-up increased through
administrative reforms. Similarly, as indicated by its policies in other
areas (viz. the move towards targeting benefits for the incapacitated,
widows and, to a lesser extent, children), the government are little
                                          
4 Arguably, some increase in the real value of Income Support would have
inevitable in any case (see Pension Provision Group, 1998).
5 The government estimates that in 2050 the proportion of pensioners claiming
Income Support will be reduced from around a third to around a quarter as a
result of the introduction of the SSP (written parliamentary answer 12.1.99).
Note though that, as the SSP will only just have matured in 2050, some of this
continued reliance on means testing reflects the fact the majority of the
pensioner population will have retired before this date, and hence will not
benefit fully from the new scheme.
9concerned with horizontal (as opposed to vertical) equity. Neither
pensioner poverty per se, nor equity, are the real reasons for the
introduction of the SSP. Instead, it is the last problem – the potential
effect of means testing (or the prospect of means testing) on individuals’
saving behaviour during their working lives – which is the chief
motivation for the replacement of SERPS.
At present this problem of ‘moral hazard’ is relatively minor; for a
single pensioner under 75, with a full National Insurance record, Income
Support is only some £11 a week above their basic pension entitlement.
But under the policy outlined in the Green Paper this differential will
grow over time, and moral hazard would undoubtedly become a
relevant policy concern if no countervailing action were taken. The
purpose of the SSP is therefore clear: it exists to ensure that low and
middle earners get more automatic assistance in building up their
pension entitlements, thereby reducing the saving disincentives
associated with means testing.
Apart from the economic arguments for minimising moral hazard,
a more prosaic justification may also be relevant. In the terminology of
Le Grand (1997), means testing promotes ‘knavish’ behaviour which is,
at once, both rational and, from society’s point of view, irresponsible.
Rather than conjoining social rights and responsibilities, means tests set
one against the other – greater ‘responsibility’ (in terms of higher saving)
may lead to lower rights to benefit, and vice-versa. Given this, it would
clearly be disingenuous for the government to simultaneously exhort
people to save while operating a policy which penalised them for so
doing. The SSP therefore makes it tenable to operate a policy of means-
testing for today’s pensioners without affecting the saving decisions of
workers, or the rhetoric of government.
2 SERPS
The benefits provided by SERPS are fairly simple to describe. As
reformed by the Conservatives in 1986, the scheme provides all
employees with a second pension worth 20% of their average lifetime
earnings between a lower and an upper limit (set at £64 and £485 a week
(£3,300 and £25,000 a year) respectively in 1998/9). At present these
earning limits are statutorily linked to the level of the basic pension, the
lower limit being the same as the basic pension and the upper limit
being between 6.5 and 7.5 times this amount. Therefore, under existing
legislation, if the basic pension remains tied to prices the earning limits
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will fall gradually from their current relative levels of, respectively, 15
and 115% of male average earnings (MAE). However, this situation has
been radically altered by the March 1999 Budget, which aligned the
lower limit with the personal tax allowance (and also raised the upper
limit). As the level of the personal allowance has more-or-less kept pace
with earnings over the last twenty years it seems reasonable to assume
that, under the Chancellor’s proposals, an earnings-link for the
contributions base for National Insurance will be (re)established.
Therefore, while the analysis in this paper is based on the 1998/9 levels
for the lower and upper NIC limits, it is assumed that these limits will
both increase in line with earnings in the future.6
Figure 1 illustrates the value of the pension provided by SERPS for
people with constant earnings throughout their working lives.7 For
convenience the Figure also shows the value of Income Support (i.e. the
minimum income standard). This is set at 17.5% of male average
                                          
6 Note, however, that the Green Paper assumes that the NIC earning limits will
remain tied to prices. Hence the illustrations of the effects of the SSP and
SERPS provided here are not directly comparable to the government’s
estimates. Note also therefore that the analysis here effectively ignores the
proposed ‘shadow’ lower earnings limit, whereby individuals will be brought
into the National Insurance system once their earnings cross the current
threshold but will then face a zero rate band of NICs on earnings up to the
actual lower limit. If this entry level were permanently linked to prices then,
over time, such a policy would gradually reduce the number of people
excluded from the SSP due to low earnings and also cause the value of the
benefits it offers to grow (see footnote 13). At the same time though it will
impose additional administrative costs on employers, and will act to further
blur the distinction between the SSP and the basic pension. It is doubtful
whether it will prove a durable arrangement in the long term.
7 More precisely, the Figure shows the value of first and second tier pension
benefits which would be paid on retirement in 2050 to someone with a
complete (49 year) work history who had unchanging earnings throughout
their life (relative to average earnings). People earning less than the lower
limit for NICs are assumed to qualify for credits towards the basic pension
(see footnote 2 earlier). The Figure also assumes that henceforth the basic
pension is increased in line with prices while the earnings limits for NICs, and
Income Support for pensioners, are increased in line with earnings. Note
therefore that the Figure makes the implicit assumption that the government
could, if it chose, increase Income Support in line with earnings while not
altering second tier provision in any way. This is not very plausible: as
discussed in Section 1, the effect of means testing on saving incentives makes
it practically impossible to operate such a policy without some form of
countervailing intervention.
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earnings, the level which it would have been in 1998/9 had Income
Support been increased to £75 a week from April 1998 (rather than the
additional increase announced in the 1998 Budget being delayed to
April 1999). In common with the Green Paper, it is assumed that the
value of the basic pension in relation to earnings will have halved by
2050, so that it falls from its current level of 15% of MAE to 7.5%. The
gap between the basic pension and the minimum income standard in
2050 is therefore 10% MAE.
As the Figure shows, because SERPS is earnings-related it provides
only rather modest benefits for people with low lifetime earnings, and
hence is of little help in lifting such people above the government’s
minimum income standard. Indeed, as the Green Paper recognises (see
page 81), any system which links benefits directly to earnings (and, by
implication, to contributions) will inevitably be of little assistance to low
lifetime earners. In essence, this is the reason why the government have
rejected calls to extend the proportion of workers’ salaries which they
are forced to contribute to an earnings-related pension (the ‘compulsion’
strategy outlined in Agulnik and Le Grand, 1998). If the objective of
pension policy is solely to secure a minimum income standard then
compulsory saving is of very limited benefit, as the people one is most
concerned about (low lifetime earners) gain least.
Similarly, restoring SERPS would also be of little benefit to the
worst-off as, even under its original guise, SERPS was almost wholly
Figure 1: Current Policy - Value of SERPS and the basic pension in 2050, 
by lifetime earnings
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earnings-related (there being no particular reason to expect the ‘twenty
best years’ rule to help low lifetime earners more than high earners). In a
revenue-neutral reform, raising the flat-rate basic pension would be
more redistributive than improving the benefits provided by SERPS
(Creedy, Disney and Whitehouse, 1993). This, in a sense, is precisely
what the SSP does – it increases spending on flat-rate benefits, rather like
an increase in the basic pension but with a fifty year time-lag.
3 The State Second Pension
Analysis of the SSP, and of second tier pensions more generally, must
take into account the fact that provision is split between the public and
private sectors. At present this split operates through a device known as
‘contracting-out’, whereby people in private pension schemes pay
reduced National Insurance Contributions (NICs) or, equivalently,
receive a rebate paid direct to their pension scheme. This contracted-out
NIC rate - currently 4.6 percentage points less than the full rate – reflects
the actuarial value of the SERPS rights which individuals would
otherwise have enjoyed. At least in theory, this therefore means that all
employees accumulate second tier pension entitlements of the same
value as SERPS, but with some people receiving benefits directly from
the state scheme and others receiving benefits via private schemes.8
This split between the public and private sectors will be retained
under the SSP, but it will take a somewhat different form. Rather than
the incentive to opt-out of state provision being neutral (i.e. actuarially-
fair), there will be a built-in incentive for individuals to stay with the
state scheme if their earnings are below £9,000 a year but to opt-out if
their earnings are above this level.
Under the Green Paper’s proposals SERPS will, in effect, become a
flat-rate scheme providing pensions for people earning less than £9,000 a
year (and for some non-earners such as carers). The value of the pension
provided by the new scheme will be substantial – twice that which
                                          
8 The equivalence between SERPS and the second pension entitlements earned
by people in private pension schemes relies on the Government Actuary
having accurately assessed likely investment returns, charges and annuity
rates. If these assumptions turn out to be too optimistic then people in private
schemes will, in retrospect, have been better-off remaining in SERPS.
Conversely, should investment and annuity rates exceed assumed levels then
people who chose to opt-out will end up with higher pension benefits than
people who stayed in SERPS.
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someone on £9,000 a year would currently get from SERPS.9
Nevertheless, people earning more that £9,000 a year will have a strong
incentive to opt-out as, above this level of earnings, the value of
contracted-out rebates will exceed the actuarial value of the benefit
provided by the state scheme.10 This in turn reflects changes to the
structure of rebates which the Green Paper proposes. In place of the
simple proportionate structure of SERPS a three tier system will operate:
 on the first tranche of an individual’s earnings, between the lower
limit and £9,000, rebates will be double the current rate;
 on the next tranche (between £9,000 and £18,500) rebates will be
provided at half their current rate;
 on the final tranche (between £18,500 and the upper limit) rebates
will continue to be paid at the same rate as under SERPS.11
                                          
9 A little arithmetic shows that someone on £9,000 a year for the whole of their
(49 year) working life would get a pension of £22 a week (in terms of today’s
earnings) from SERPS, assuming that the lower earnings limit is increased in
line with earnings in the future, and ignoring the rise in the level of the lower
earnings limit announced in the March 1999 Budget. The SSP will provide a
pension for all its members (including those earning less than £9,000 and non-
earners) at twice this level, i.e. £44 a week for someone who remains in the
scheme throughout their working life. Uncoincidentally, £44 a week is
fractionally more than 10% of MAE, the gap between the basic pension and
Income Support in 2050.
10 Note, however, that even if people did act perfectly rationally in response to
the incentives provided by the SSP, this prediction assumes that the level of
rebates will adjust fully to the age of the recipient: as older people are closer
to retirement, and hence benefit from less years of investment growth than
younger people, they require higher rebates to be persuaded to opt-out. But
whether the government will in fact provide fully age-related rebates is
doubtful. To achieve full age-relation under SERPS the rebate paid to
someone aged 55 should be equivalent to 15% of their earnings – a figure
thought intolerably high by the last government who instead chose to cap
age-related rebates at 9% (Government Actuary 1995, Table C). If history
repeats itself the current government will similarly cap rebates for older
workers. Therefore, as well as earnings affecting the decision as to whether to
opt-out, age may also have to be taken into account.
11 Presumably, this retention of the earnings-replacement principle is simply to
ensure that no one sees their pension benefits reduced relative to their current
position under SERPS (ignoring the better benefits which some richer women
would have been entitled to under Home Responsibilities Protection - see
footnote 15). However, in fact the point at which people would start losing
from the reduction in rebates on the tranche of earnings beyond £9,000 a year
14
The second tier pension benefits provided by the SSP and rebates
are illustrated in Figure 2.12 For the reasons explained above it is
assumed that people earning more than £9,000 opt-out (and hence
accumulate earnings-related pensions), and that people earning less than
this amount opt-in. Like Figure 1 earlier, it is also assumed that earning
levels remain constant throughout life (this assumption is relaxed later).
Note that the ‘bend points’ in the scheme at £9,000 and £18,500
correspond, respectively, to 40 and 85% of male average earnings.
As can be seen from the Figure, the flat-rate SSP fills the gap
between the basic pension and the minimum income standard much
more effectively than SERPS. Indeed, the Figure well illustrates the fact
that the SSP has been designed to rather neatly plug the gap between the
level of the basic pension and the minimum standard in 2050. However,
the seeming elegance of this outcome is just that - a fortuitous feature of
                                                                                                                                  
is £20,000, not £18,500. Everyone will therefore enjoy higher benefits as a
result of the Green Paper’s proposals, albeit only very marginally so for
people earning more than £18,500. This discrepancy within the scheme is
recognised by the DSS, and is likely to be corrected in the government’s final
proposals, therefore, to simplify analysis, it is effectively assumed here that
the benefits received by people on earnings above £18,500 are the same as
they would get under SERPS.
12 See footnote 7 earlier for notes.
Figure 2: Future policy - Value of second pension and the basic pension in 
2050, by lifetime earnings
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the date chosen to illustrate the scheme rather than an inherent property
of its design. Peering a little further into the future we can already
predict that, unless the lower contribution limit falls steadily in relation
to earnings, the gap between the combined value of first and second tier
pension benefits and the poverty line will re-emerge (see Rake,
Falkingham and Evans).13
Moreover, irrespective of the time horizon chosen for analysis, the
Figure gives a rather false impression of the true effects of the scheme.
The assumption that individual earnings will remain constant
throughout life is clearly unrealistic; in practice we all experience
considerable changes in our labour market status and earnings over the
course of our lives (see Hills and Gardiner, 1999; or Gregg, 1997).
Allowing for this a rather less elegant pattern for the benefits provided
by the SSP emerges, with almost all women, and a significant number of
men, benefiting from the flat-rate element of the scheme at some point in
their lives. This is because the SSP works through crediting pension
rights on an annual basis - there is no ‘claw-back’ from people with high
lifetime earnings.14 Table 1 illustrates, also providing figures for SERPS
for ease of comparison.
                                          
13 It should, however, be borne in mind that the Figure refers to the 1st and 2nd
tier pension entitlements which individuals will accumulate in their own right
and, similarly, the level of Income Support for a single pensioner (aged 65-74)
is shown.  However, as the level of Income Support for couples is significantly
less than twice that for single people, the combined 1st and 2nd tier pension
entitlements of couples should lift them substantially above the minimum
income standard even beyond 2050. Note also that, should the government’s
proposed shadow lower NIC limit prove durable, an element of
‘dynamisation’ will be built into the scheme, as the £9,000 figure will be
increased in line with earnings while (presumably) the entry point for the SSP
will be tied to prices.
14 The SSP is therefore rather different from the minimum pension guarantee
systems outlined by Atkinson (1995), Hills (1997) and Falkingham and
Johnson (1995) which, in effect, all act as a lifetime means test.
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Table 1: Value of 2nd stage SSP and the basic pension in 2050,
hypothetical individuals
Earnings/status Basic
pension
State scheme
pension
rights
Private
pension
rights
Total 1st and
2nd tier
pension
under SSP
Total pension
under  SERPS
(without
HRP15)
£5,000 throughout
life
£32 £44 - £76 £38.5
£5,000 with ten
years caring
£32 £44 - £76 £37
£5,000 with ten
years unemployed
£32 £35 - £67 £37
£10,000 throughout
life
£32 - £46.5 £78.5 £56
£10,000 with ten
years caring
£32 £9 £37 £78 £51
£10,000 with ten
years unemployed
£32 - £37 £69 £51
£15,000 throughout
life
£32 - £56 £88 £77
£15,000 with ten
years caring
£32 £9 £45 £86 £68
£20,000 throughout
life
£32 - £64 £96 £96
£20,000 with ten
years caring
£32 £9 £51 £92 £83
Note: The Table shows the weekly value of first and second tier pension benefits in
terms of today’s earnings. As earnings will have approximately doubled by 2050, the
real value of benefits will be twice as large. Nevertheless, denominating pension
entitlements in these terms is probably a more helpful approach than using ‘real
price’ terms (see the notes to Chart 5, page 41 of the Green Paper).
                                          
15 HRP = Home Responsibilities Protection. When originally designed SERPS
operated on a ‘best 20 years’ formula which was, in theory, designed to help
people with intermittent earnings histories. HRP was intended to give further
assistance to carers to compensate for years out of the labour market.
However, the introduction of HRP only becomes relevant in April 1999 when
SERPS enters its 21st year and, as yet, no regulations have been laid to put the
earlier legislation into operation. As such secondary legislation is required to
implement HRP, and no action on this front has yet been taken, the benefits
provided by SERPS in its current form are illustrated.
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4 The Redistributive Effect of the SSP
The redistributive effect of the SSP can be calculated as the increase in
second tier pension entitlements enjoyed by people on different earning
levels (which, as noted earlier, is positive or zero for everyone) minus
the loss of income resulting from the increased contributions needed to
finance the scheme. This section looks at each part of this equation in
turn, showing how the benefits of the scheme can usefully be expressed
in present value terms, and calculating the change in NIC rates needed
to finance additional provision. The overall redistributive effect of the
scheme is then illustrated in Figure 4.
Distribution of benefits
As the previous section showed, the SSP works on annual basis (in the
same way as SERPS also does). Anyone earning below £9,000 (but more
than £3,300) in a particular year will receive a credit for the state scheme,
whether or not their earnings (and hence pension entitlements)
subsequently increase. Therefore, though they receive a pension promise
rather than a cash payment, the system may be likened to the rebates
which people earning more than £9,000 will receive. Ignoring the fact
that people in the state scheme receive a pension promise rather than a
cash payment, if future pension entitlements are discounted to their
present value (PV) then the benefits of public and private provision may
be compared directly. Table 2 illustrates, showing the PV of benefits
(equivalently, the value of rebates) under SERPS and the SSP.
As can be seen from the Table, the transformation of SERPS into
the SSP will greatly increase pension benefits for low and moderate
earners. For instance, someone earning £5000 a year will be nearly £450 a
year better-off as a result of the change, as the PV of their future pension
benefits rises from £78 under SERPS to £525 under the SSP. This, in turn,
reflects the fact that they would have only got a pension worth 1.5% of
MAE from SERPS (assuming they had constant earnings throughout
life), while they will get a pension of just over 10% MAE from the SSP.
However, gains fall away as earnings rise, and people on more than
£18,500 receive no additional pension benefits as a result of the
government’s proposals (again assuming their earnings do not
fluctuate).
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Table 2: Value of benefits under SERPS and the SSP
Earnings Earnings
between limits
PV of SERPS
benefits16
PV of SSP
benefits/
value of
rebates
Change in
benefits
£5000 £1700 £78 £525 £447
£10000 £6700 £308 £548 £240
£15000 £11700 £538 £663 £128
£20000 £16700 £768 £768 0
£25000 £21700 £998 £998 0
£30000 £21700 £998 £998 0
The PV of future pension benefits can helpfully be used to
calculate the net cost of NICs for people at different earning levels. This
is simply the gross cost of NICs minus the value of future pension
benefits which arise as a result of contribution, the net figure so derived
being a better representation of the true burden of National Insurance.
Table 3 illustrates. As can be seen, under the SSP someone earning
£5,000 a year (but more than the lower limit) will in effect receive more
back from National Insurance than they pay in through contributions.
This point is made even more clearly in Figure 3, which shows the
burden of NICs as a proportion of all earnings (rather than just earnings
between the limits, as in Table 3). It shows that for people earning below
£8,500 a year NICs work in much the same way as a negative income
tax, albeit with the benefit of the ‘tax-credit’ being delayed until
retirement.
                                          
16 The PV of SERPS benefits is calculated using the Government Actuary’s
economic assumptions, and hence is equivalent to the rebate which would be
payable under contracting-out. At present, SERPS rebates represent 4.6
percentage points of the total NIC rate (averaging across all ages). However,
this is set to fall over time to around 3.5 percentage points, as the ‘accelerated
accrual’ provisions within SERPS gradually die out. As the SSP contains no
accelerated accrual provisions the comparisons in the Table should really be
calculated with reference to this steady-state rebate rate. The results of the
analysis would, though, be little different, and for ease of exposition the
current reduction of 4.6 percentage points is used.
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Table 3: Net cost of NICs under the SSP
Earnings Earnings
between
limits
Gross NI
contributions
17
PV of SSP
benefits/
Value of
rebates
Net NIC
payment
Net NIC
payment as a %
of earnings
between the
limits
£5000 £1700 £170 £525 -£355 -20.1%
£10000 £6700 £670 £548 £122 1.8%
£15000 £11700 £1170 £663 £632 4.3%
£20000 £16700 £1670 £768 £902 5.4%
£25000 £21700 £2170 £998 £1172 5.4%
£30000 £21700 £2170 £998 £1172 5.4%
Financing the proposals
The SSP will be ‘paid for’ out of the National Insurance Fund, in the
same way as the basic pension, SERPS and other NI benefits are
currently. As the SSP offers better pension benefits than SERPS for low
and moderate earners, and equivalent pension benefits for high earners,
it follows that NIC rates must rise if the Fund is to remain in balance
(which, under current policy, it must).18 However, it should be noted
that under current policies the combined NIC rate is expected to fall by
around 4.25 percentage points between now and 2050 (w.p.a. 11.2.99).19
                                          
17 To avoid double-counting the gross cost of contributions is shown (i.e. the
amount someone contracted-in to SERPS currently pays). The cost of the 2%
‘entrance fee’ for NICs, which was abolished in April 1999, is ignored, as are
NIC payments made by employers.
18 In the normal course of events NIC rates are set so that they yield sufficient
revenue to meet expected expenditure from the NI Fund. Administratively
this operates through the Government Actuary estimating (on a five-year
basis) the NIC rates needed to keep the Fund ‘in balance’ (see, for instance,
Government Actuary 1995a). A zero Treasury grant is assumed and, at least
in recent years, payments to the Fund from this source have been negligible.
19 It should also be borne in mind that the Government Actuary’s projections
assume that the NI contribution limits will be increased in line with prices
rather than with earnings. This means that a worker on average earnings will
experience an even more dramatic fall in the burden of NI contributions than
is implied by the change in the rate of such contributions (see w.p.a. 15.2.99).
As it is assumed elsewhere in this paper that the NIC limits will increase in
line with earnings in the future, the analysis here should really be based on
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Nevertheless, for analytical purposes whether NIC rates are set to fall or
rise is irrelevant – the question is who wins and loses from the SSP
relative to current policy.
The SSP will add to NIC rates (or rather, prevent NIC rates from
falling) for two reasons:
1. The cost of rebates will grow, necessitating an increase in the NIC
rate to maintain revenue to the Fund.
2. As the scheme matures public expenditure will rise relative to
expected spending under SERPS.
The cost of rebates will grow both because the SSP produces
higher pension benefits than SERPS for people earning less that £18,500,
which will be reflected in employees on such earnings receiving bigger
rebates, and because more people are likely to opt-out of state provision
under the new scheme. In combination the effect will be to increase the
                                                                                                                                  
the NIC rates which would apply under earnings indexation of the
contribution base. However, for ease of exposition the following looks only at
the change in NIC rates caused by the SSP relative to the 4.25 percentage
point reduction expected under a price-linked contribution base.
Figure 3: Net burden of NICs under the SSP and SERPS (before 
financing)
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total cost of rebates by £4.1 billion in 2050 (when the scheme will be fully
phased-in).20 Making up for this lost revenue will, in turn, require NIC
rates to be 0.9 of a percentage point higher than would otherwise be the
case.21
The long run increase in NICs as a result of the SSP will be even
greater than this. The government estimate that, by 2050, expenditure on
the new scheme will be £10.5 billion higher than it would have been
under SERPS (w.p.a. 11.2.99). This will add a further 2.25 percentage
points to the NIC rate (under the same assumptions as earlier). In the
long term, therefore, the NIC rate will be a little under 3.25 percentage
points higher under the SSP than it would have been under SERPS. In
other words, rather than falling by 4.25 percentage points, the NIC rate
will only be around one percentage point lower in 2050 than it is today.
However, this does not quite give the full story. Though the new
scheme will increase the cost of NI benefits, it will also reduce spending
on means tested benefits. The government estimate that the introduction
of the SSP will lead to savings on Income Support of around £4.3 billion
(w.p.a. 11.2.99).22 Assuming that this saving is used solely to reduce
income tax rates, a fall of around 0.6 of a percentage point might be
expected as a result (assuming the higher, basic and lower rates are all
reduced by the same amount). For ease of analysis this is included in
                                          
20 Government Actuary’s estimate taken from a written parliamentary answer
on 15.2.99. It is worth noting that the Government Actuary’s very low
estimate for the increased cost of NIC rebates in 2010 (a rise of only £0.9
billion compared to previous policy) suggests the new system of rebates will
be introduced rather slowly. However, behavioural changes, as occurred
when personal pensions were introduced, may cause a more rapid rise in the
cost of rebates than the Government Actuary predicts.
21   Assuming that Class 2, Class 4 and employer contribution rates do not
change, i.e. that employee NIC rates bear the full adjustment needed to keep
the NI Fund ‘in balance’. Note that the £4.1 billion estimate is in real price
terms and hence, allowing for the increase in the tax base for NICs resulting
from earnings growth, the necessary increase in the NIC rate is half what
would be required today.
22 This estimate is relative to the level of expenditure expected under a policy of
increasing the minimum income standard with earnings but retaining SERPS
in its existing form. Note again that this figure is in real price terms, and
hence in relation to today’s tax base is half as large as indicated. Also note that
there are good reasons for thinking that income tax rates may be higher in the
future than they are today, as the ageing of the population is likely to have a
very significant impact on NHS spending.
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Figure 4 as an offset to the increase in the NIC rate, reducing the
necessary rise to about 2.5 percentage points. The Figure therefore
shows the overall distributional effect of the SSP, taking into account the
value of benefits, the effect of financing these benefits through NICs, and
the effect of lower income tax rates.
As the Figure shows, after taking into account the necessary
increase in NIC rates the effect of the SSP is to redistribute resources
from people earning over about £12,000 a year to people earning less
than this amount (but more than £3,300). However, it is worth bearing in
mind that the Figure only looks at people with earnings between the
lower and upper limit, and therefore omits ‘very high’ earners. For such
individuals NICs operate as a lump sum tax and, as can be seen from the
Figure, the cost of this tax will be larger under the SSP (contributions
having risen while benefits stay the same). But, precisely because NICs
act as a lump-sum tax once the upper limit is exceeded, the burden of
this increase (i.e. as a proportion of earnings) will be heaviest for people
earning at the limit. As earnings increase above the limit the
proportionate impact of higher NICs will fall. Moreover, at extremely
Figure 4: Overall winners and losers from the SSP
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high earnings the effect of the assumed decrease in income tax rates will
outweigh the loss resulting from the increase in NICs.
It is also worth briefly commenting on the SSP’s effect on the
distribution of lifetime income. From one perspective the scheme is
unambiguously positive: low earners benefit from considerably higher
pensions than they would have got under SERPS but only pay a small
fraction of the financing costs. However, this conclusion subtly alters if it
is assumed that the minimum retirement income standard would in any
case have risen in line with earnings. If the scheme is looked at in this
way its effect is not to increase pensioners’ incomes but to reduce the bill
for means tested benefits, in which case it could be argued that the main
gainers from the SSP are better-off people who now receive pension
credits for periods outside the labour market (see Table 1 earlier).
However, as discussed in Section 1, it is very unlikely that a policy of
increasing Income Support with earnings but leaving other areas of
pension policy untouched would have been either politically or
economically feasible. The Green Paper’s proposals must therefore be
analysed as a package.
5 Conclusion
The analysis of the Green Paper presented above suggests there are
three major problems, or potential problems, with its proposals. First, as
readers may have gathered, the SSP is a complex scheme, difficult to
understand and perhaps to implement. Second, while it does far more
than SERPS to meet the government’s objective of achieving a minimum
retirement income standard without means testing, it does not guarantee
that means tests for pensioners will be eradicated. Last, as the tax base
used for financing benefits contains an upper limit, the redistributive
effects of the scheme, while positive, are rather unusual, with low
earners gaining at the expense of better paid workers, but with the
burden of losses being highest for people earning at the upper limit for
NICs.
In fact, all three of these flaws may be seen as arising out of the fact
that the SSP will be a National Insurance benefit. Having two rather than
one mechanism for collecting revenue from workers is, in itself, likely to
add to the complexity of the tax system, not to mention the benefits
system. Moreover, in order to justify its separation from the tax system
National Insurance was explicitly designed to be exclusive – to offer
benefits only to contributors rather than everyone. Similarly, the
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existence of the upper earnings limit helps to distinguish the NI system
from general taxation, but at the same time means that NICs are
regressive relative to income tax.
The upper limit to NICs is particularly problematic. At present its
existence can be justified by the structure of SERPS, and if the
government really believed in earnings-related pensions a case for its
retention could be made. But, as shown by the Green Paper’s analysis of
the ‘pensions problem’, it is clear that New Labour do not believe it is
the state’s role to force people to have a pension income above the
minimum standard. The earnings-related element of the SSP therefore
arises partly out of a desire not to create any obvious ‘losers’ from the
scheme, and partly out of the chosen mechanism for splitting provision
between the public and private sectors. However, in terms of the
objectives of the Green Paper, this earnings-related element of
compulsory provision doesn’t really make a great deal of sense.
Similarly, it is questionable whether the upper limit makes sense in
terms of who should bear the burden of additional pension spending.
The SSP is therefore best seen as a compromise between the
government’s goals for pension reform, and for social policy more
generally, and its inheritance from past administrations, both Labour
and Conservative. Figure 5 illustrates, showing how the government’s
plans fit into a ‘decision tree’ for pension policy. Three separate branches
are shown, relating to decisions about the structure of first and second
tier benefits (should they attempt only to ensure a minimum standard or
should they also relate benefits to previous earnings/participation?), the
tax base used for financing benefits (all income or earnings only and, if
the latter, with or without a ceiling?), and whether or not the taxes used
to finance benefits should be separated out from the tax system (i.e.
‘hypothecated’), and if so whether benefits should be linked to
contribution. Of course, in reality decision makers are unlikely to look at
pension policy in this disaggregated way but, nevertheless, the diagram
may usefully illustrate how the SSP differs from earlier policies.
In terms of the structure of benefits (the left hand branch of the
Figure), the SSP’s major innovation is to link retirement income to past
‘participation’ rather than past earnings. However, an element of
earnings-related provision remains, reflecting the government’s
inheritance from earlier policies. Similarly, as shown in the right hand
branch of the Figure, the Green Paper strengthens the link between
participation and benefit receipt, in effect providing a large bonus for
people who cross the lower contribution threshold (of £3,300). Again,
though, the inherited link between benefits and earnings has been
25
retained in a weakened form. Note, therefore, that in both instances the
citizenship principle has been ignored.
However, while the government have significantly altered the
structure of second tier pensions, and thereby how contributions are
linked to benefits, they have not attempted to change the way in which
benefits are financed (the middle branch of the Figure). This,
presumably, reflects the government’s commitment not to raise tax or
NIC rates. Therefore, though more radical reform of National Insurance
might have been expected given the Green Paper’s stated objectives for
pension policy, it is apparent that the scope for reform has been limited
by the legacy of previous pension policies and, perhaps more
importantly, by the government’s election promises.
How does this analysis relate to the Green Paper? Perhaps most
importantly it shows that the National Insurance system needs to be
looked at as whole; while the Green Paper’s concentration on the
benefits provided by the SSP reflects its departmental responsibilities, it
is not the best example of ‘holistic government’. On the one hand tunnel-
vision about pensions can give the wrong answers: as illustrated by the
March 1999 Budget, the assumptions in the Green Paper about the level
of the NIC earnings limits and how they are uprated over time seem
very unlikely to hold true. On the other hand, tunnel-vision can give a
wrong (or, at least, incomplete) impression of the effects of a policy. For
instance, the Green Paper appears to suggest that everyone is a winner
from their proposals. Unfortunately, this is an arithmetical impossibility
– improving benefits costs money, and this money has to come from
somewhere. As this paper has shown, that ‘somewhere’ is people
earning over around £12,000 a year, with the burden of the scheme
falling most heavily on people earning at the upper limit for NICs.
Of course, people won’t actually ‘lose’ in the sense of paying more
NICs than is currently the case; rather, they will fail to gain through the
NIC reductions which would otherwise have taken place. Even so, if the
government are concerned to spread the burden of the Green Paper’s
proposals more fairly they need to adjust either the structure of benefits
and rebates, or how these will be financed. In regard to the former the
scheme could offer higher, or more widely available, benefits through
the SSP (boosting the gain at the bottom so that the scheme is more
redistributive overall), or higher rebates between £9,000 and £18,500
(raising the point at which ‘losers’ start). This might be paid for by
capping rebates at the amount which someone of £18,500 will receive, so
that the last component of the SSP’s rather peculiar 40/10/20 accrual
structure is effectively abolished. Conversely, the government could
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keep benefits constant but finance the scheme more fairly. One simple
solution would be to reintroduce a Treasury grant to the National
Insurance Fund, so that revenues from (income) tax absorb the cost of
additional spending; this might bring the scheme more into line with
Beveridge’s original conception of the position of the National Insurance
Fund in the government’s accounts (see Titmuss, 1958). Alternatively the
upper earnings limit could be raised, e.g. to the starting point for higher
rate tax. In both cases the effect would be to bring in more revenue, thus
allowing NIC rates to fall as predicted under previous policy or,
preferably, paying for an increase in the lower earnings limit. However,
whether the remaining principled arguments for National Insurance can
withstand such changes is doubtful. Its death is probably inevitable,
though not necessarily lamentable.
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A public-private partnership in pensions:
Getting the balance right
Nicholas Barr
1 Introduction
The New Insurance Contract in the December 1998 pensions Green
Paper includes as a central objective,
An assurance of a secure and decent income in retirement for
all through the new minimum income guarantee ... Over the
longer term our aim is that it should rise in line with
earnings so that all pensioners can share in the rising
prosperity of the nation ... (Department of Social Security,
1998, p.2, para.6).
In barest outline, the Green Paper proposed:
 Continuing the existing contributory basic state pension, indexed
to price change.
 Reforming the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) state earnings-related
pension (SERPS) (to be renamed the Second State Pension). The
formula for people earning below £9000 is made more generous,
and eligibility is increased by making credits (i.e. deemed
contributions) for carers more widely available. This aspect of the
reform is assessed in companion papers in this volume by
Agulnik, and Falkingham and Rake, and Rake, Falkingham and
Evans (1999).
 Introducing stakeholder pensions – simple, heavily regulated,
individual funded accounts (i.e. a money purchase arrangement)
intended primarily for people with earnings above £9000 who do
not have the option of joining an occupational scheme.
Membership of a stakeholder pension would be voluntary. This
paper is largely concerned with assessing the resulting change in
balance between PAYG and money purchase schemes.
 Continuing existing arrangements for occupational and personal
pensions.
These arrangements, it is claimed (Summary, paras 40-44), are fair, are
affordable, provide greater security, and build a new partnership. Some
of the proposals represent unambiguous progress:
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 Boosting the state pension for lower earners through the second
state pension – though Falkingham and Rake (this volume) and
Rake, Falkingham and Evans (1999) show that the detailed design
of the proposed arrangements leaves significant gaps and
perpetuates gender imbalances.1
 Extending credits to carers for the purposes of the second state
pension.
 Surrounding action on such things as long-term care.
Other features require close scrutiny:
 The trend to continuing – if anything, to enhanced – reliance on
income-testing for people whose pension entitlement leaves them
below the minimum income guarantee, creating significant
incentives against saving for people with low lifetime earnings.
 Claims that stakeholder pensions (a) offer greater security and (b)
have macroeconomic advantages.
The next section examines in turn the latter two claims for
stakeholder pensions. Its conclusions form the basis for the argument in
the final section for a public-private balance in which the state pension
arrangements avoid the need for an income test.
2 Assessing the stakeholder pension approach
2.1 Old age security
The Green Paper claims (Summary, para. 27) that stakeholder pensions
will be secure, low cost and flexible.
Security in old age has at least two dimensions. The level of the
pension (i.e. a person’s living standard in old age) as established by the
minimum income guarantee is discussed in this volume by Agulnik, and
Falkingham and Rake, and by Rake, Falkingham and Evans (1999). A
second aspect is the degree of certainty about the pension, i.e. pensioners
need ‘to know how much they should save to deliver the income they
want in retirement’ (Summary, para. 24).
                                          
1 Gaps arise because the proposals incorporate only a small margin between
the state pensions package (i.e. a full basic pension plus second state pension)
and the income-tested minimum income guarantee. The resulting problems
include what the authors call (a) tightropes – low earners may well fail to
escape income testing, and so have little incentive to contribute or save, and
(b) tripwires – common interruptions to earnings mean that many people will
not receive the full package.
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The idea of stakeholder pensions. At their simplest, stakeholder
pensions work as follows. The individual puts money into her pension
‘pot’ week by week while working; by the time she retires, she will have
accumulated a lump-sum; at retirement that lump sum is converted into
an annuity (Department of Social Security, 1998, p.61).2 The size of her
pension will depend, first, on the size of the lump sum, determined by:
(a) the amount and timing of her contributions; and
(b) the performance of the pension fund, which in turn depends on
the quality of management and the performance of financial
markets.
The real value of the annuity will depend on the size of the lump sum,
plus
(c) her age at retirement;
(d) the state of the annuities market; and
(e) inflation during her retired years.
The pension will not depend on gender, since annuities, as with current
approved occupational arrangements, will be required to offer unisex
benefits. The issue of indexation is taken up later.
Thus stakeholder pensions are individual, defined-contribution,
funded schemes. Such money-purchase schemes, as is well known, face
a number of risks, relating particularly to (b), (d) and (e). The rest of this
section explores those risks as they apply to stakeholder pensions and
discusses actions to ameliorate them.
Management risk. Pension funds require substantial regulation to
protect consumers in areas too complex for consumers to protect
themselves. There is no need to belabour the point, exemplified by mis-
selling (UK Treasury Select Committee, 1998) and the Maxwell scandal
(UK Pension Law Review Committee, 1993). Separately, management
may be honest but incompetent.
The Green Paper proposals represent significant progress in
addressing the management risk, not just for stakeholder pensions but
for private sector pensions generally. The emphasis on regulation is
welcome. What are needed are tightly drawn up regulatory procedures
and the resources to implement them effectively. The latter task is more
difficult than it looks: precisely because private pensions are such
complex instruments, regulators need to be highly skilled – the sort of
skills with a high price in the private sector.
                                          
2 A fraction of the pension accumulation can be taken out as a lump sum
(Department of Social Security, 1998, p.62).
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The emphasis on improving information is also welcome, both
through the availability of telephone inquiry lines and through ‘an
annual statement for all those in public and private schemes detailing
their current predicted pension’ (Summary, para.34). For this purpose it
is essential that all statements are required to have a common format,
and to be based on common definitions of rates of return, inflation, etc.,
just as credit card companies are required to use a common definition of
the interest rate. Such transparency is essential to ensure that the claims
of competitors are directly and precisely comparable.
Investment risk. Even if managed with complete probity and high
competence, pension funds face the risk of differential pension portfolio
performance (i.e. two people with identical earnings and contributions
records may end up with very different pensions) and, more generally,
are vulnerable to stock-market fluctuations, i.e. a stock-market
downturn could adversely effect the lump sums, and hence the
annuities, of an entire cohort.
Stakeholder pensions, properly implemented, could reduce the
investment risk in comparison with previous personal pension
arrangements. First, the average return to pension funds is boosted by
keeping costs low, for example by collecting contributions through
payroll deductions and by limiting advertising expenditure. Note,
however, that the cost of running an individual pension account is
broadly independent of the amount of contribution, making
administrative costs proportionately higher for lower earners. Since
charging each pensioner a fixed amount would largely eat away small
pensions, the Green Paper proposes that administrative charges are
levied in the form of x% of contributions. This is probably right, but it
risks creating incentives for the better-off to switch to a personal
pension. Should that happen, stakeholder pensions will be bought
mainly by lower earners, necessitating a higher percentage contribution
to cover administrative costs.
Another way in which stakeholder pensions could reduce the
investment risk is by requiring funds to be run on fairly simple lines, e.g.
as tracker funds, rather than actively managed, thus reducing or
eliminating the lower tail of pension fund performers.
The good news is that these two aspects ensure that pension funds
broadly parallel average financial market performance. The bad news is
that that average is far more volatile than the contributions base on
which the state pension is based. Stakeholder pensioners remain
vulnerable to stock market developments, most particularly to a
downturn at the time that they convert their lump-sum into an annuity
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(and, as discussed below, to fluctuations in the annuities market). At its
starkest, consider individuals A and B with identical lifetime
contributions profiles: if A retires when the stock market index stands at
5000, and B retires six months later when the stock market has fallen to
4000, B’s stakeholder pension will be 20 per cent lower than A’s. A 20
per cent fall is far from fanciful: it could be triggered by sharp stock-
market falls in other countries, as in 1987, or by broader financial crises
elsewhere, with no need to invoke more apocalyptic events (oil shock,
use of ex-Soviet nuclear missiles by religious extremists, assassination of
major world leader…).
Thus if people are obliged to convert on the day they retire, and if
they are obliged to retire on their sixty-fifth birthday, the value of their
stakeholder pension is to a significant extent a lottery. To reduce the
resulting inequity, it is therefore essential, as the Green Paper proposes
(p.62, para.79), to allow flexibility over the timing of conversion of a
person’s lump sum into an annuity.3 In addition, thought should be
given to designing methods which offer more powerful smoothing
options.
The remaining – significant – investment risk is inherent in the
logic of individual funded accounts in general, and stakeholder pensions
in particular.
The annuities risk. The annuity a person can buy with her lump
sum depends on (a) her expected duration of retirement, i.e. her
remaining life expectancy at the time she retires, and (b) the interest rate
the insurance company expects to earn over the lifetime of the annuity,
in particular the rate of interest on long-term gilts. There is an element of
uncertainty about the first variable. Much more important, however, the
return – even on long-term gilts – varies, so that a person who retires
during a recession, with low interest rates, may receive a significantly
lower annuity than someone who retires during a period of higher
interest rates.
A second, and separate, problem is that the annuities market is
thin: with competing insurance companies, each company has only a
small share of the market, and hence only a few people in each age
group. Thus the opportunity of economies of scale is lost and,
consequently, transactions costs are high. This reduces the value of an
annuity, quite independent of interest rate fluctuations.
                                          
3 Thus under stakeholder pensions, as with current arrangements, retirement
can take place at any age between 50 and 75.
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The inflation risk. Defined contribution schemes can generally cope
with inflation during the build-up of pension rights, and with a given
rate of anticipated inflation once the pension is in payment. But they do
not cope well with unanticipated post-retirement inflation. The reason is
straightforward: the real value of the annuity depends on the lump sum,
life expectancy and the real rate of interest the insurance company can
earn (i.e. the excess of the nominal interest rate over the rate of inflation).
Two cases need discussion.
 Certainty: if inflation is 5 per cent per year with certainty, it is an
easy matter to offer an annuity which rises by 5 per cent each year.
Inflation is no problem.
 Uncertainty: inflation is a common shock and thus an uninsurable
risk. A possible escape route where inflation is purely domestic is
to hedge through an internationally diversified portfolio of
pension assets. Another escape route, from the insurer’s
perspective, is to offer limited indexation. If the limit is 5 per cent
then, so far as the insurer is concerned, the situation is similar to
the certainty case, above – the risk of inflation beyond 5 per cent is
transferred to the pensioner.
The conclusion is that once pensions are in payment, private,
funded schemes can cope with limited inflation, i.e. can offer indexation
up to some pre-specified level. This is what is known as limited price
indexation, under which approved occupational and personal pensions
in the UK are required to index pensions fully for annual inflation of up
to 5 per cent and which, presumably, is the regime intended for
stakeholder pensions. Beyond that limit, however, personal pensions
face major problems. The point is much more than academic. The price
index in Britain in January 1974 was 100; in September 1978, in the wake
of the first oil shock, it was 200. With 5 per cent indexation, pensions
would have increased from 100 to about 128, rather than to 200.
Pensions in payment would have lost one-third of their value. Two
points are noteworthy: the loss is permanent – in contrast with pensions
during build up, there is no opportunity to make up any of the lost
ground; and people in the future will generally be retired for longer than
their forebears.
In the absence of publicly-organised indexation, stakeholder
pensioners will thus be vulnerable to post-retirement inflation. There is a
clear and continuing role for government to address this risk. There are
several ways to do so.
(a) Mandating limited price indexation of pensions (say for inflation
above 5 per cent), supported by government indexed bonds.
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(b) Indemnifying pension funds for inflation above 5 per cent.
(c) Mandating full price indexation, supported by indexed bonds.
The present intention for stakeholder pensions is (a). However, a strong
case can be made for full price indexation, both to give pensioners
security and to ensure that stakeholder pensions have the same
indexation provisions as the (fully price indexed) second state pension.
One way to bring this about is through (c), at a minimum for
stakeholder pensions, ideally also for approved occupational and
personal pensions subject to an upper limit. This policy, however, might
create distortions in the gilts market, for example if a very large fraction
of the total demand for bonds was from pension funds buying indexed
gilts. If that were a problem, an alternative policy package would be (a)
plus (b).
Economic growth. This is not the end of the story, however. The
Green Paper rightly argues that pensioners should share in rising
prosperity. But individual funded pensions, including stakeholder
pensions, do not allow a pensioner, once retired, to share in rising living
standards. Annuities attract limited price indexation but not earnings
indexation. Thus only the minimum income guarantee would be
earnings indexed; the stakeholder pension, once in payment, would
decline relative to average earnings, even if its real value was protected,
thus attenuating shares in rising prosperity. As a result, the oldest
pensioners will disproportionately be the poorest. Yet these are the very
pensioners who are the most likely to require care, and hence to face
higher costs.4
Two additional risks, it is sometimes claimed, afflict individual
funded pensions less acutely than Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) state
pensions.
Demographic risk. Demographic shocks affect a PAYG system by
shrinking the contributions base (or the rate of growth of the
contributions base). Other things being equal the smaller the generation
of workers the smaller the contributions base, correspondingly reducing
the average pension which can be supported by a given contributions
rate. With funding the mechanism is more subtle, but equally
inescapable, operating through a mismatch between demand and
supply in either the goods market or the assets market.  The mechanism
merits explanation.
                                          
4 As a stylised fact, retirement can be divided into period 1, in which the person
can look after him/herself, and period 2, when he/she needs care from
others. Period 2 is, of course, far more costly.
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Suppose that a large generation of workers is followed by a
smaller generation. Thus there is a large accumulation of pensions funds
belonging to the older generation at a time when the workforce is
declining. The high level of retirement spending out of its accumulated
savings by the older generation will exceed the pension contributions of
the smaller younger generation, reducing the rate of saving in the
economy, and possibly leading to aggregate dissaving. Pensions then
face pressures through either or both of two mechanisms.
 Price inflation: assume the price of pensioners’ financial assets
remains unchanged. In that case, net pensioner consumption is
greater than saving by workers; and at full employment this
causes demand inflation, thus reducing the purchasing power of
pensioners’ annuities.
 Deflation of pensioners’ financial assets: if the desired sales of
assets by the large pensioner generation exceeds desired asset
purchases by the smaller succeeding workforce, asset prices will
fall. In consequence, the lump sum received by the representative
pensioner, and hence the resulting annuity, will decline.
In sum, the argument that funding insulates pensioners from
demographic change should not be overstated. The policy implication is
that demographic change is not per se a strong argument for shifting the
balance of pension finance towards funding.
Political risk. A different argument is that social insurance is more
vulnerable politically than private schemes, either through government
failure (e.g. profligate promises which cannot subsequently be fulfilled)
or though a change of policy (e.g. the change in the indexation
provisions for the basic state pension in the late 1980s, or the removal of
some of the tax advantages of private pension funds announced in the
July 1997 budget).5 The proposition that social insurance is more
vulnerable than private schemes may or may not be true as an empirical
matter in a particular instance, but it is important to be clear that
effective government is essential for any pension arrangement.
Government failure harms both state and private schemes. The
problem is most obvious with defined-benefit state PAYG schemes built
on promises which are fiscally unsustainable. Results include
inflationary pressures, reneging on past promises and, at its worst,
                                          
5 Prior to the change, contributions were paid out of pre-tax income and the
income and capital gains of pensions funds were also tax free. In a change
announced in the July 1997 Budget, the income, but not the capital gains, of
pension funds are taxable.
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political instability. Private pensions, however, are also vulnerable. At a
macroeconomic level, fiscal imprudence leads to inflation which can
decapitalise private funds. At a microeconomic level, problems arise if
government lacks the capacity to regulate financial markets.
In contrast, effective government assists both state and private
schemes. Government failure is not inherent. Governments throughout
the OECD are putting into place cost containing measures in the face of
demographic prospects (see Department of Social Security, 1993), recent
reform in Sweden (Federation of Social Insurance Offices, 1998) and
Canada being prime examples. Government capacity, similarly, assists
private schemes by providing macroeconomic stability and effective
regulation. The key message for policy design is that pensions depend
on private sector capacity and government capacity.
A separate aspect of political risk is the argument that ownership
rights over private funds may have greater legitimacy than claims to a
state pension. Thus, it is argued, government might be less likely to
interfere with pension funds than with the benefit formula of a PAYG
pension. It is true that UK governments have made the national
insurance pension less generous – by changing from earnings indexation
to price indexation, by altering the formula under which the state
earnings-related pension benefits are calculated, and so on. There are at
least two responses. First, it was precisely that flexibility which allowed
governments in a demographically more benign era to make pensions
more generous. Second, private pension funds are not immune from
changes in policy – the change in the tax treatment of pension funds in
1997 has already been mentioned.
The conclusion is that stakeholder pensioners are just as
vulnerable as state pensioners to government failure; and the argument
that they are less vulnerable to government interference (i.e. a change in
the rules) is an empirical matter requiring proof rather than assertion.
2.2 Macroeconomic gains
The Prime Minister states in his Foreword to the Green Paper:
These reforms mean that the total income of pensioners will
rise in years to come, mainly fuelled by rising contributions.
Public spending on pensions will rise too in real terms, but
less sharply, and will fall as a proportion of national income.
This will ensure that the pension system remains both fair
and affordable (p.iv).
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The implication is that stakeholder pensions, by reducing the publicly-
funded component of pensions from 60% to 40%, have macroeconomic
advantages (‘affordable’). This view, which underpins the Green Paper
strategy, needs testing.
The simple macroeconomics of pensions. There are two (and only two)
ways a person can provide consumption for his old age. It is possible,
first, to store current production by setting aside part of current output for
future use. This is the only way Robinson Crusoe could guarantee future
consumption, and is the method used by owner-occupiers to store
housing services for old age. Beyond such limited cases, however,
organising pensions in this way is a non-starter (for fuller discussion, see
Barr, 1998, Ch.9).
The alternative is for individuals to exchange current production
for a claim on future production. There are two broad ways in which a
person might do this: by saving part of her wages each week she could
build up a pile of money which she would exchange for goods produced
by younger people after her retirement; or she could obtain a promise –
from her children, or from government – that she would be given goods
produced by others after her retirement. The two strategic methods of
organising pensions broadly parallel these two sorts of claim on future
production, funded schemes being based on accumulations of financial
assets, and PAYG schemes, ultimately, being based on promises.
Under both PAYG and funding, therefore, pensioners’
consumption comes out of current production. This truth holds
whatever the financial mechanism by which pensions are organised.
Thus what matters is the future level of output.
Pensions and output growth. Having established the centrality of
output, the next questions are how it might be increased, and what role
pensions might play. In principle, output can be increased by either or
both:
 Increasing the productivity of each worker. This will involve
increasing the quantity of capital, improving its quality, and/or
improving the quality of labour.
 Increasing the number of workers from each age cohort and/or
their hours of work. This will involve reducing unemployment,
increasing labour force participation, particularly by married
women, raising the age of retirement, and/or importing labour.
Thus, the menu of policies to increase output are:
(a) Increasing the quantity and quality of capital equipment, e.g.
robots.
(b) Improving labour through more education and training.
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(c) Increasing labour force participation, for example by reducing the
tax wedge and by such policies as better child care facilities.
(d) Raising the age of retirement. The macroeconomic gain is that this
decreases the number of pensioners and increases the number of
workers. The social policy gain is that pensions are reduced not by
reducing living standards in retirement, but by a shorter duration
of retirement.
(e) Importing labour either directly (more relaxed immigration rules)
or indirectly (exporting capital to countries with a young labour
force).
From a macroeconomic perspective, therefore, there is a gain from
moving towards funding only if that policy systematically leads to
higher rates of growth. Such a move, however, has no direct bearing on
policies (b) − (e).6 Thus the argument boils down to whether funding
contributes directly to growth (policy (a), above). In the face of a large
and controversial literature (see Barr, 1992, 1998, Ch.9; Thompson, 1998),
two observations are relevant. First, the magnitude of the effect is
controversial; it is far from clear that a move to funding makes a large
difference. Second, the debate about the economic impact of funding
should not deflect our eye from the ball – namely that what matters is
growth; and for that latter purpose, we should consider the entire menu
of policies, not focus exclusively on pension funds.
Thus the macroeconomic gains of a shift towards funding should
not be overstated. This opens up significant policy options.
3 Policy directions
The arguments in the previous section lead to two strategic conclusions:
 Stakeholder pensions, though potentially a major advance on
previous personal pensions, are not completely secure – because
by their nature they cannot be. Additional action, outlined in
section 3.1, could reduce the degree of uncertainty, though not
eliminate it.
 The macroeconomic advantages of stakeholder pensions should
not be overstated. Specifically, the macroeconomic gain of shifting
                                          
6 There could be an indirect effect on (c) if funding, by reducing taxation,
increased labour supply. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the wage
elasticity of labour supply, at least for primary workers, is inelastic to changes
in tax rates in the range of tax rates typical in industrial economies.
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the balance from a public:private ratio of 60:40 to one of 40:60 is
less than the Green Paper implies. This opens up the possibility of
a slightly different balance, discussed in section 3.2, between state
and private pensions.
3.1 Enhancing the security of stakeholder pensions
Addressing management risk. The Green Paper proposals address
management risk head on.
 Alongside prudential regulation, the laudable emphasis on
improving information should be buttressed by mandating a
common format and common definitions of key variables.
 Implementing regulation effectively will be a major challenge, and
will require adequate resourcing because the necessary skills
command a high price in the private sector.
Reducing investment risk. Investment risk is inherent with schemes
like the stakeholder pension. Action to reduce that risk to the
unavoidable minimum include:
 Keeping management costs low, thus increasing the net-of-
administration return to pension savings.
 Running funds along simple lines, e.g. as tracker funds, thus
reducing or eliminating the lower tail of pension performers.
 Allowing flexibility over the timing of converting a person’s lump
sum into an annuity, as discussed earlier, to allow at least some
smoothing of stock-market fluctuations. Giving the individual a
measure of choice over the date of conversion (and perhaps, as
discussed below, also his or her date of retirement) is essential to
minimise the effects of what would otherwise be a pensions
lottery.
Improving the operation of annuities markets. Given the potential
economies of scale in the provision of annuities, a strong case can be
made for state action on annuities, including, perhaps, provision either
of the annuity itself, or of ‘annuity gilts’ constructed to average across
interest-rate fluctuations.7 If the operation serves merely as a smoothing
mechanism, there should be no long-run public expenditure
implications.
Dealing with the inflation risk. Government can and should take
action to reduce the inflation risk facing stakeholder (and other private)
pensioners.
                                          
7 I have stolen this idea from Phil Agulnik.
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 The requirement that private pensions should offer at least limited
price indexation (the current requirement is full indexation for
inflation of up to 5 per cent) should continue, for stakeholder
pensions and for occupational and personal pensions.
 The government should continue to issue indexed bonds.
 Government should indemnify stakeholder pensions and
approved occupational and personal pensions against inflation
above 5 per cent, up to some upper limit for a person’s annual
pension.
Sharing economic growth. Though it is intended that the minimum
income guarantee will increase with earnings, an individual’s
stakeholder pension, by its very nature, cannot rise in line with post-
retirement increases in average earnings. Thus the stakeholder pension
will decline relative to average earnings over a person’s retirement,
leaving her poorest when she is oldest. One way forward is to pay a tax-
funded age-related supplement – either to the state pension or the
stakeholder pension – to allow pensioners to share in rising national
prosperity after their retirement, and to ensure that the frail elderly have
sufficient resources to pay for the additional care they need. This
suggestion raises no new principle, since pensions already rise with age
to a limited extent through higher tax reliefs for older people, through a
small addition to the basic state pension to the over-80s, and through a
minimum income guarantee which rises with age. These variables
should be reviewed to allow elderly people more systematically to share
in economic growth.
Links to long-term care. Given such links between pensions and care
in old age, the reform of pensions and the – very welcome –
recommendations of the Royal Commission on long-term care should be
considered together.
3.2 Bolstering the minimum pension
The earlier argument that funding is not a critical instrument in
addressing demographic risk has a major implication: it means that a
fiscally prudent case can be made for a somewhat smaller shift in the
balance between public and private pension spending, giving increased
headroom to bolster the minimum pension in some or all of the
following ways.
Making the second state pension more generous (a) to plug the gaps for
people with low and/or intermittent earnings identified by Agulnik
(this volume) and Rake, Falkingham and Evans (1999), and (b) to
address the gender imbalances discussed by Falkingham and Rake (this
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volume). This could be done inter alia by extending eligibility, by
increasing the value of the second state pension to give a ‘margin of
error’ to cover some of the potential gaps, or by a mix of the two
approaches.
Eliminating income testing for the great bulk of the elderly
population, thus addressing one of the Green Paper’s strategic flaws –
the disincentives to saving for low earners. There are a number of ways
of doing so. The simplest method is to pay a higher basic state pension.
A more targeted approach is to introduce a minimum pension guarantee
based on criteria other than current income, for example some sort of
lifetime income test of the sort described by Atkinson (1995) and Hills
(1997).8
Affluence testing. An additional option, if fiscal constraints were
regarded as binding, is to subject the basic state pension not to an
income test (designed to restrict benefits to the poor), but to an affluence
test, which has the more limited purpose of clawing back benefit from
the rich. The Australian example (December 1998 figures) is illustrative.
The first £35 or so of a married couple’s age pension is totally
disregarded; thereafter pension is withdrawn at a rate of 25 per cent per
person. Thus the state pension is not completely extinguished until a
couple’s income from other sources exceeds about £275 per week. In
short, all but the best off receive at least some state pension.9
Flexible retirement age. There are major advantages in allowing
people to choose when to retire, such that someone who delays
retirement receives an actuarially enhanced pension. To illustrate,
consider someone with a life expectancy of 80 who delays retirement
                                          
8 Under a minimum pension guarantee, anyone receiving any SERPS at all will
receive a top up to bring their state pension to the income support level. This
has the advantage (a) of ensuring old age security, (b) without an income test
(piggy-backing on SERPS is, in effect, a lifetime income test), while (c) being
more tightly targeted than increasing the basic pension, and (d) since not
conditioned on private pension or other saving, has no adverse incentive
effects.
9 In December 1998, the level of the age pension was A$298.10 per fortnight for
each of husband and wife, i.e. a total pension of A$596.20, with a disregard of
A$176 per fortnight of combined income from other sources. Thereafter
pension is withdrawn at a rate of 25 per cent from each of husband and wife
for each dollar of income from other sources. Benefit is extinguished when the
combined income of the couple from other sources reaches A$1379.20 per
fortnight (Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services,
1998, Table 1).
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from 65 to 68. Her pension ‘pot’ is thus payable over 12 years instead of
15, making it possible to pay a 25 per cent higher pension out of the
same pot.10 If she continues to make contributions between 65 and 68,
the effect is stronger, since the pot becomes larger. Thus in social policy
terms, a flexible retirement age enables someone who wants a higher
pension to get one fairly quickly. In macroeconomic terms, this is
possible at zero fiscal cost – a much more powerful instrument for
addressing funding problems than adjustments to the balance between
public and private funding.
An additional, more radical, option is to make the size of a
person’s pension at age 65 depend not only on his or her contribution
record, but also on the size of his or her cohort. Other things being equal,
therefore, someone from a larger cohort receives a somewhat smaller
pension, thus containing aggregate pension spending. The person could
then increase his or her pension at zero aggregate cost by delaying
retirement. This is the route taken by recent reform in Sweden.11
                                          
10 Ignoring interest, if a pot of 150 is paid out over 15 years, it gives a pension of
10; paid out over 12 years, it yields a pension of 12½.
11 See Sweden: Federation of Social Insurance Offices (1998) and/or
http://www.pension.gov.se.
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‘Partnership in Pensions’:
Delivering a secure retirement for women?
Jane Falkingham and Katherine Rake
In the foreword to the new Green Paper ‘A New Contract for Welfare:
Partnership in Pensions’ the Prime Minister promises a radical reform of
the whole pension system to ensure that “everyone can look forward to a
secure retirement” (Department of Social Security, 1998a). In particular he
highlights that the ‘partnership approach’ of the Green Paper will
deliver “dramatically better pension provision for … those unable to work
because they are caring for children or a relative who is ill or disabled”, the
majority of whom are women.
The inadequacy of the current British pension system for women
emerges starkly from every report on pension income. The high risk of
poverty that female pensioners run has been well documented. Older
female pensioners and women in single person households are
particularly vulnerable to low incomes – nearly two-thirds (62%) of
single female pensioners have income in the bottom two quintiles of the
income distribution, with only 6% in the top fifth of the distribution
(DSS, 1997a). These groups are consequently more reliant on Income
Support and other means-tested benefits – 1.2 million women over 60
claim Income Support compared to 561,000 men (DSS, 1998b). Yet old
age is a predominantly female experience. 60% of those aged over 65 are
women and women make up three-quarters of those aged over 85. In
light of the magnitude of the ‘pensions problem’ for women, the ability
of the proposed reforms to deliver a fair deal to women should be a key
criteria on which to judge the merits of the proposals. Will they deliver
women, as Tony Blair promises, “the security we all want, now and for the
future”?
1 The ‘pensions problem’ for women
The ‘pension problem’ for women stems from their different life course
experiences in combination with a pension system that is not designed
to meet women’s needs. Governments (the current one being no
exception) have been quick to identify how behavioural differences
between women and men, in labour market participation and in the
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division of caring labour, impact upon income in old age. They are,
however, more reluctant to examine those institutional features that
perpetuate the economic advantages and disadvantages experienced
during the working life into inequality in old age. We argue here that
women’s ‘pension problem’ arises from a combination of behavioural
differences and institutional features of the pension system:
1. Women spend fewer years in the labour market – all parts of the
pension system reward long working lives. For the basic pension, a
shorter working life jeopardises the ability of many women to
meet the time requirements placed on entitlement – a full basic
pension requires that contributions have been made for 9/10ths of
the ‘normal working life’ of 49 years.1 Receipt of Home
Responsibility Protection (HRP) reduces the length of the ‘normal
working life’ (i.e. with 5 years of HRP coverage the normal
working life is taken to be 44 years), subject to a minimum of 20
years, but does not alter the 9/10ths requirement for full payment
of the basic pension. Lack of contributory years means that
currently 51% of women do not receive a basic pension in own
right. For second tier pensions (including SERPS), shorter working
lives simply mean less time to accumulate entitlements and a
consequent lower income in old age.
2. Women earn less than men – all parts of the pension system either
operate an earnings requirement and/or pay out earnings-related
pensions. An earnings requirement, in the form of the Lower
Earnings Limit (LEL), operates for the basic pension and SERPS.
When earnings fall below the LEL, as they do for at least 2 million
women each year (McKnight et al., 1998), contributions are lost for
that year reducing or jeopardising final entitlements.2 Evidence
points to the persistence of low pay – spells below LEL are likely
to accumulate across the lifetime with serious consequences for
income in later life. Pay outs of all second tier schemes (SERPS,
occupational and private pensions) are related to earnings or to
contributions made during the working life (which are, in turn,
                                          
1 From 2020 harmonisation of women and men’s retirement age will mean that
the basic pension will be based on a working life of 49 years for both.
2 The exception to this is where those below LEL are entitled to HRP, in which
case credits will be given for that year.
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related to earnings), so that low earnings in the working life
translate into low income in old age.
3. Women have less access to occupational pension schemes –
occupational pensions continue to offer the best value for money
second tier provision. Although women’s membership of
occupational pension schemes has risen since 1945 the gender gap
in occupational pension membership remains marked and since
the early 1980s women’s membership levels have stagnated. In
1994, 38% of full time female employees were members of an
occupational scheme compared to 56% of male (ONS, 1996). Where
women receive an occupational pension, average pay-outs are low.
Data from the DSS Retirement Survey suggests that the median
amount received from an occupational pension by women was £31
a week (January 1996 prices) compared to £71 received by men
(Disney et al., 1997). Small amounts of occupational pension may
bring little or no financial gain. Rather a small private pension may
merely disqualify the recipient from entitlement to means-tested
benefits and with them all the other passported benefits – the so-
called occupational pensions trap (Walker et al., 1989). As a
consequence of both lower membership of schemes and lower
benefits when in payment, women rely more on the state, and on
means-tested benefits, as a source of income in old age. This makes
the level at which such benefits are payable especially important to
women.
4. Women live longer than men – inadequate protection of survivors
and inadequate inflation proofing of pensions affect the older
elderly most. Women’s greater longevity means that they are more
likely to experience bereavement in later life and the consequent
change in household income. Furthermore, the impact of uprating
benefits and pension income at a level below the rate of growth in
earnings is greater the longer the period spent in retirement.
Where pension income is indexed to prices, incomes will fall
relative to the rest of the population - with the greatest relative loss
of income experienced by the older elderly, the majority of whom
are women.
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2 The Green Paper and women
Given women’s greater reliance on the state as a source of income in
later life, the proposals in the Green Paper will affect women
disproportionately and as such it is essential to examine their gender
impact.
In outlining the problems of the current system, the Green Paper
recognises the behavioural causes of women’s lower incomes in old age,
but not the institutional ones. The Green Paper states that “Women tend
to fare worse than men because of their different working patterns and greater
longevity” promising more research which will, in an unspecified way,
“inform future Government thinking” (paragraph 15, p.14). Beyond this,
bar the important section on carers which is discussed below,
recognition of the difficulties that women face in gaining pension
entitlement passes unnoticed. The proposals are typically gender-blind –
for example, the statement “Almost everyone of working age builds up rights
to a basic state pension” (paragraph 32, p.20) directly contradicts the
figures cited earlier in the paper showing that just under half of women
currently claim a basic pension in their own right. There is no
disaggregation of recipients of means-tested benefits by gender, despite
the marked gender imbalance shown above. The discussion of the
occupational pension tier declares that “Occupational pension schemes are
one of the great welfare success stories of this century” (paragraph 19, p.18),
and fails to present any statistics on membership by gender. Such
statistics would reveal the serious qualification that the statement needs
– in terms of inclusiveness, and from the point of view of promoting
equality of membership, occupational pension schemes cannot be
counted a success. Is the government assuming that the gender
imbalance of membership will wither away over time, or is it not
considered a sufficiently important issue to attract comment and action?
 Where a breakdown of membership by gender is made, it proves
rather revealing. Talking about projected membership of the new
Stakeholder Pensions (SHP) the Green Paper states: “Those in today’s
workforce who are most likely to join stakeholder pension schemes are
predominantly in full-time work…Roughly two-thirds are men and a third are
women” (paragraph 13, p.49). This shows that the government’s
expectation is that the gender imbalance of the occupational and private
pension sector will be mirrored by SHP. This pensions vehicle, which
will be privileged relative to the State Second Pension (SSP) in terms of
payment in retirement, is to be populated in the majority by men, so that
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the ghettoisation of women in the poorer parts of the pension system
goes unchanged and unchallenged.
Where the Green Paper is more comprehensive is in its references
to carers, whose needs are explicitly recognised: “There are millions of
carers in the UK, most of whom are women…We believe there is a strong case
for helping them” (paragraph 22, p.42). Help comes in the form of credits
to SSP. As part of the discussion of credits, an interesting, if rather
under-specified, reference is made to the disabled who have had some
labour market work which has, nevertheless, proved insufficient to
build up entitlements. The Green Paper states that “there is a strong case
for introducing similar arrangements” for these individuals, with a test of
labour market attachment made “at the point of award” (paragraph 25,
p.43). If we understand this proposal correctly, credits will operate both
as compensation for those whose labour market histories have been
interrupted through care of others, and those who have experienced
interruption through disability. On first sight the proposals seem both
generous and comprehensive and have the aim of ensuring that
“everyone with a lifetime of work behind them (or credits from caring) builds up
rights to a pension which lifts them above the minimum income guarantee in
retirement” (paragraph 12, p.30). The government estimates that by 2050,
four million will gain from this credit (the majority of whom will be
women) and they will experience an increase in their pension income of
£50 per week (paragraph 28, p.43). However, when we look at the
proposals in more detail (below), the operation of these credits in reality
may be less generous and comprehensive than the government would
have us believe.
3 How far is the problem solved?
1. Women spend fewer years in the labour market – all parts of the
pension system reward long working lives.
As with previous pension reforms, the Green Paper attempts to
compensate women for their shorter working lives by offering credits,
but we have major concerns about the effectiveness of the proposed
credits.
Firstly, SSP credits are less generous than those offered by the
present system. Currently, those registered as unemployed get National
Insurance credits that count towards their basic pension (SSP offers no
coverage to the unemployed), while Home Responsibility Protection
also offers credits towards the basic pension. The most important aspect
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of current HRP is that which covers child care – currently over 99% of
HRP years are claimed by women looking after dependant children
(DSS, 1997b). HRP is available to those looking after children up to the
child’s 18th birthday if s/he is in higher education, up to 16 if not. By
contrast, SSP credits offer coverage only until the child enters primary
school and effectively cuts coverage by at least 11 years when compared
to that available under HRP. According to our estimates this would
affect a potential 6 million individuals (mainly women) at some stage in
their lifetime. For other carers, the credits to SSP are as generous as HRP
with those caring for someone who receives Attendance Allowance or
Disability Living Allowance or who themselves receive Invalid Care
Allowance all qualifying for credits, apparently without time limit.
However, given the small number of individuals who claim credits in
this way (under 10,000 per annum), this apparent generosity will have
little impact.
Secondly, SSP credits will embody some of the problems of the
previous system which mean that the credits will offer only limited
rewards in reality. Although the Green Paper does not spell out how
credits will work, if they operate in the same way as HRP does
currently, the title ‘credits’ is misleading. In reality, credits do not
provide a full year of contributions but rather deduct a year from the
contributory requirement of a full working life. While this seems like a
technical footnote it can have very real consequences, especially for
those with extended periods of credits.
Thirdly, credits operate within SSP only. They are not transferable
to other parts of the pension systems, and do nothing to enhance
entitlements to Stakeholder, occupational or private pensions. If
individuals accumulate entitlements across a number of parts of the
pension system (for example, SSP combined with some SHP), then the
value of the credits to SSP may be limited, and in extreme cases lost
altogether. Assuming that SSP operates in the same way as the basic
pension, a woman works and contributes to SSP for five years, followed
by nine years of child care which are given credits. When she returns to
the labour market, she decides to take out a Stakeholder pension. At
retirement, the nine years’ credit and five years’ contributions are not
sufficient to bring her over the minimum contributory threshold, so she
receives nothing from her contributions or credits.3
                                          
3 If SSP operates in the same way as the basic pension, payments will be made
on a sliding scale with full payment requiring 9/10ths of the working life, and
no payments made if contributions fall below 25% of the contributory
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Fourthly, even if a woman did gain full entitlement to SSP, there are real
questions about the adequacy of this as a source of income. As Rake et
al. (1999) show, even those single women with full SSP entitlement are
very likely to fall into income-testing at, or early on in, retirement.
Contrary to government claims, credits to SSP do not give carers an
extra £50 of income a week when compared to the claims they could
make to the minimum income guarantee regardless of years of earnings
or credits.
2. Women earn less than men – all parts of the pension system either
operate an earnings requirement and/or pay out earnings-related
pensions.
The Green Paper does nothing to address the problem of the lack of
coverage of those earning below the LEL, the majority of whom are
women. No SSP coverage is offered to those women who take low paid
employment which they can combine with their caring responsibilities
for children over primary school age. What is more, the change signalled
by the Green Paper in the overall pension mix has an important effect on
women’s outcomes. By continuing the shift away from a pension system
which relies on pay-as-you-go towards individual funding, the
government’s ability to use the pension system to redistribute between
high and low lifetime earners is further eroded.
3. Women have less access to occupational pension schemes –
occupational pensions continue to offer the best value for money
second tier provision.
Barbara Castle introduced SERPS in 1975 as an alternative second tier
pension for those who were unable to contribute to occupational
pensions. The original SERPS, because it was based on the best 20 years
of earnings, promised to minimise the adverse effect of interruptions to
women’s working lives due to caring responsibilities on the amount of
this pension. The combination of SERPS and the basic pension were
redistributive to the low paid, providing a maximum replacement rate
of 50 percent for a female full-time manual worker and lower rates for
                                                                                                                                  
requirement. In the case of our example, she has 5 years of contributions. Her
‘working life’ is calculated as 40 years (i.e. 49 minus the 9 years of credit), and
so to be entitled to any payment she needs to have contributed for at least
25% of 9/10ths of 40 years i.e. 25% of 36 years, which is 9 years. As she has
not done this, the woman has no entitlement and in effect loses all her credits
and contributions. In reality she would have been better off delaying taking
out a SHP for a further 3 years.
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higher earners (Groves, 1991). Changes in pension provision since then
have reversed this advance; in particular the 1986 Social Security Act
which changed the basis of calculating average earnings from the best 20
years to the whole working life – resurrecting the very institutional
structures that work to the disadvantage of women. SSP has been
presented as a replacement for, and an improvement on, SERPS.
However, contrary to the government’s claims, SSP will not provide an
improved alternative second tier pension because in maturity it will pay
out a flat-rate benefit which will barely lift individuals above the means
tested minimum. In reality SHP has better claims to being a second tier
pension, but like the occupational and private sectors will exclude many
women. Once again, women will be left in a part of the system that will
pay out the lowest benefits in retirement. The ability of higher paid
workers to opt out of SSP means that SSP risks being a residualised
system populated principally by low paid women. Any part of the
welfare system in which the middle classes do not have a vested interest
carries significant political risk – when cuts have to be made, such parts
of the welfare system are vulnerable, and even more so if they are
feminised, given women’s lack of political voice.
4. Women live longer than men – inadequate protection of survivors
and inadequate inflation proofing of pensions affect the older
elderly most.
An effective pension system needs to provide protection from inflation
throughout an individual’s period of retirement. Women’s greater
longevity means that they are particularly vulnerable to the erosion of
levels of income through inadequate indexation. The Green Paper
proposals fail on a number of counts. First, SSP and the basic pension
will be indexed to prices not earnings thus excluding older people from
sharing fully in the benefits of economic growth, and forcing reliance on
the means-tested minimum income guarantee which will be linked with
growth in earnings (this issue is fully explored in Rake et al.). Second,
SHP income will depend upon an annuity purchased at the point of
retirement. Annuities rarely, if ever, provide full inflation proofing (see
Barr, this volume). In the long run many women and men who retire on
SHP will find their incomes dropping below that of the means-tested
minimum income guarantee. This will send a signal to younger workers
that there is little reward to thrift.
The Green Paper also makes no explicit reference to the treatment
of SSP on bereavement. If no provisions are made for survivors within
SSP, then, again, SSP will be less generous than SERPS. For low earning
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couples dependent on the basic pension and SSP, the lack of inheritable
rights will mean a move to means-tested assistance on bereavement.
4 Conclusion
Taking the ‘pensions problem’ for women seriously, and using it as a
criteria on which to judge the merits of the Green Paper has raised a
number of serious difficulties that the proposals face in delivering a fair
pension to women. These are:
 the potential ghettoisation of women in SSP (the part of the system
that pays out the poorest benefits on retirement) leaving it
vulnerable to cutback in later years;
 the de facto exclusion of women from the parts of the system (SHP
and occupational pensions) that promise a higher income in old
age;
 the inadequate protection of individuals throughout the period of
retirement because of inadequate indexation of income;
 the lack of provision for survivors within SSP;
 the inadequacy of credits to SSP in compensating for the time that
women take out of the labour market to perform caring duties;
 the continuing lack of coverage of low paid women workers.
An argument in the defence of the Green Paper that could be made
is that women and men’s labour market participation rate have
converged in recent years and that the problems identified here will be
less acute for future cohorts of retirees. Looking cross-sectionally,
participation rates of women and men have indeed moved closer.
However, much of this convergence is explained by a growth in
women’s part-time participation, and falling rates of participation
amongst men. What the ‘convergence thesis’ also ignores is that over the
lifetime participation rates for women and men remain markedly
different because of women’s efforts to combine reproductive and
productive roles. Furthermore, the move to the flexible labour market
for many is a move to an insecure labour market, with interrupted
earnings histories becoming the norm.
The Green Paper has been a missed opportunity. The institutional
features that contribute most to the perpetuation of economic
disadvantage experienced during the working life into inequality in later
life remain unchanged. Indeed, the shift away from collective provision
and the emphasis on individual responsibility will reinforce this
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inequality, so that many women will continue to experience poverty in
later life.
56
References
Department of Social Security (1997a), Households Below Average Incomes
1979-1994/5. London: The Stationery Office.
Department of Social Security (1997b), Home Responsibilities Protection
Statistics. Newcastle: Government Statistical Services.
Department of Social Security (1998a), A New Contract for Welfare:
Partnership in Pensions. Cm 4179. London: The Stationery Office.
Department of Social Security (1998b), Social Security Statistics 1998.
London: The Stationery Office.
Disney, R., Grundy, E. and Johnson, P. (1997), The Dynamics of
Retirement, DSS Research Report No.72. London: The Stationery
Office.
Groves, D. (1991), ‘Financial provision for women in retirement’ in
Maclean, M. and Groves, D. (eds), Women’s Issues in Social Policy.
London: Routledge.
McKnight, A., Elias, P. and Wilson, R. (1998), Low Pay and the National
Insurance System: A Statistical Picture. Manchester: EOC.
ONS (1996), Living in Britain – Results for the 1994 GHS. London: HMSO.
Rake, K., Falkingham, J. and Evans, M. (1999), Tightropes and Tripwires:
New Labour’s Proposals and Means-testing in Old Age, CASEpaper 23.
London: London School of Economics.
Walker, A., Hardman, G. and Hutton, S. (1989) ‘The occupational
pensions trap: towards a preliminary specification’, Journal of Social
Policy, 18(4): 575-93.
57
Pension Tax Reliefs and the Green Paper
Phil Agulnik
A substantial proportion of state support for retirement incomes is
provided through the tax system. Official estimates by the Inland
Revenue put the cost of pension tax reliefs at £12.2 billion, equivalent to
around 40% of the cost of the basic state pension. Moreover, as this
paper shows, a large proportion of this benefit goes to the better-off. In
particular, people who pay tax at the higher rate for all or part of their
working lives but retire on an income which attracts basic rate tax gain
significantly over their lifetime. At the same time, the current system
offers only rather modest incentives for poorer people to save for
retirement, with lower rate taxpayers qualifying for tax relief on pension
contributions at half the rate of people earning over £30,000 (the start of
the higher tax band). While probably not the main cause, the current
system of tax reliefs therefore helps explain why private pension
entitlements in the UK are so unevenly distributed. As such, the way tax
support for pensions is operated reinforces other factors which are
tending to widen pensioner income inequality.
This paper discusses the Green Paper’s proposals for the tax
treatment of Stakeholder pensions, focusing in particular on the
proposed limit of £3,600 on voluntary contributions to such schemes,
and on the suggestion that people will be able to contribute to
Stakeholder schemes from unearned income. Both of these changes, it is
argued, make more radical reform of pension tax reliefs significantly
more likely. But before looking at the Green Paper’s proposals it is
worth setting out the effects of the current system.
The cost and distributional effect of the current system
The components of the Inland Revenue’s estimate for the cost of pension
tax reliefs in 1996/7 are set out below:1
                                          
1 It should be noted that the Inland Revenue’s costing ignores the fact that
pension contributions made by employers also receive favourable treatment
from the National Insurance (NI) system. While employee contributions are
included in individuals’ gross pay, and hence constitute part of the tax base
used for calculating employee and employer NICs, pension contributions by
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Tax relief on contributions = £9.2bn
Tax relief on investment income of funds = £7.5bn
Tax relief on lump sum payouts (unfunded schemes) = £0.4bn
(Revenue from tax on pension payments = £4.9bn)
Total = £12.2bn
This paper looks exclusively at the £9.2bn cost of contribution
relief. Tax relief on pension funds’ investment income was severely cut
back by the July 1997 Budget, which abolished Advanced Corporation
Tax (ACT) credits. This change was expected to almost halve the cost of
this form of relief, and further changes in this area in the near future
seem unlikely. More importantly, however, there is a strong argument
for ignoring this element of the Revenue’s costing altogether. The fact
that pension funds do not have to pay tax on their investment income
does not necessarily mean that they are tax advantaged - other saving
instruments also enjoy this tax status, and it is a moot point as to
whether the treatment afforded to pension funds represents the
exception or the rule. If the tax treatment of savings put into bank or
building society accounts is seen as the norm then there is a genuine
revenue loss resulting from failing to tax investment returns. But if the
relevant comparison is with the tax treatment of Individual Savings
Accounts (ISAs), where returns are free of tax, then the ‘cost’ of
investment income relief is illusory - if money were not contributed to a
pension it would be put into some other savings vehicle where
investment income was not taxed, hence there would be no additional
tax revenue.2 Accordingly, the only potential source of loss from the
provision of pension tax reliefs relates to the exemption of pension
contributions from liability to income tax and the existence of the tax-
free lump sum.
It is frequently argued that the cost of contribution relief is
effectively zero - the fact that contributions to pension schemes are tax-
free while payments are taxed means that revenue is not lost but merely
deferred. This argument is incorrect. Even after taking into account the
                                                                                                                                  
employers are not counted as a benefit-in-kind. Consequently neither
employer nor employee NICs are payable on such pension contributions,
causing revenue to the NI fund to be lower than would otherwise be the case.
2 See Dilnot and Johnson (1993) for a fuller exposition of this argument.
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fact that revenue from tax on pension payments in the future (financed
out of today’s higher contributions) is likely to be around £1 billion
greater than revenue from pensions currently in payment (£4.9bn in
1996/7), this still falls considerably short of the £9.2bn cost of
contribution relief (see Agulnik and Le Grand, 1998). This situation
arises for two reasons. First, individuals often pay tax at a lower rate in
retirement than during their working lives, partly because of the higher
age-related tax allowances which they become eligible to, and partly
because income tends to go down in retirement. Second, the lump-sum
part of a pension payment (limited to 25% of the pension fund in a
personal pension, or one and a half times final salary in a defined benefit
scheme) may be taken tax-free, hence further reducing the amount of tax
collected on pension benefits.3 Taken together, these factors mean that
only a little over half the cost of contribution relief is returned to the
Exchequer through tax on pensions in payment.
Distribution of contribution relief
As shown in Agulnik and Le Grand (1998), a large proportion of the
total cost of contribution relief is accounted for by higher rate taxpayers.
This results from two factors. First, the propensity of people to be in a
private pension scheme increases with income, so that 90% of workers
with earnings of £20,000 or more are in a private pension scheme
compared to only 40% of workers with earnings of £7,000. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows membership of personal and
occupational schemes as a proportion of the workforce. The figure also
shows that there is a significant difference between personal and
occupational schemes, with membership of occupational schemes rising
steadily as earnings increase to £25,000 then declining thereafter, while
membership of personal pensions rises steadily, but more slowly, with
earnings.4
                                          
3 It follows that, while both ISAs and pensions allow individuals to accumulate
interest free of tax, in general people who save in the form of a pension will
pay less tax over their lifetime than those who save via an ISA. This
advantage would only disappear if the average rate of relief on pension
contributions (currently around 27%) was reduced to the average rate of tax
on pension benefits (currently around 17%), or vice-versa.
4 Data from the New Earnings Survey, which looks only at the pension position
of full-time employees in occupational or group personal pension
arrangements, provides a rather different profile for scheme membership. In
particular, it suggests that membership of occupational schemes peaks at a
60
The second reason for the regressivity of pension contribution
relief relates to the fact that people can claim back tax at their marginal
rate, so that higher rate taxpayers receive proportionately more tax relief
than basic and lower rate payers (reflecting the higher marginal rate at
which they pay tax). Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, showing the average level
of contributions (and the amount of tax relief received on such
contributions) by members of, respectively, personal and occupational
pension schemes.5 Note that the proportion of the total pension
contribution accounted for by tax relief increases at £30,000, where
higher rate tax becomes payable.
                                                                                                                                  
slightly higher level than the Inland Revenue data indicate, and only tails off
very marginally as earnings rise above £25,000.
5  Pension contributions made by employers on their employees behalf are
ignored. Given the high level of such contributions, the Figure significantly
understates the overall level of pension entitlements being built up by
members of occupational schemes, and the cost of tax relief for such schemes.
However, the distribution of contributions by employers may be different
from that of employees, and available data do not allow such contributions to
be incorporated into the analysis here.
Figure 1: Membership of pension schemes in 1996/7 as a 
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An additional explanation for the regressivity of contribution relief
system might be that the low paid are reluctant to save for a pension.
However, there is little evidence to support this proposition. Figures 4
and 5 show how much, on average, members of personal and
Figure 2: Average pension contribution by members of 
personal schemes 1996/7, by earnings
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Figure 3: Average pension contribution by members of 
occupational schemes 1996/7, by earnings
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
37
65
45
00
55
00
70
00
90
00
11
00
0
13
00
0
15
00
0
17
00
0
19
00
0
22
00
0
26
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
50
00
0
Pe
ns
io
n
 c
o
n
tr
ib
ut
io
n
 £
Ow n contribution Tax relief
62
occupational contribute as a proportion of their earnings. The latter
Figure shows that contributions to occupational schemes are an almost
constant proportion of earnings while, in contrast, contributions to
personal pensions are inversely proportional to earnings, at least for
people on less than £12,000 pa. The fact that low earners account for a
small proportion of the overall cost of pension tax reliefs cannot
therefore be seen as a reflection of insufficient prudence on their part.
Indeed, the evidence presented here suggests that low earners who are
making voluntary contributions to personal pension schemes are more
willing than their richer peers to see a large proportionate drop in their
income.6
                                          
6 The actions of personal pension providers may also affect the saving
behaviour of low earners. In particular, personal pension providers may not
be willing to accept rebate-only business from people on low earnings, as the
value of contracted-out rebates will be insufficient to make a private pension
economical once the effect of flat-rate charges has been taken into account.
Providers may therefore insist that low earners make voluntary contributions
to their pension account of at least, say, £10 a week. Even this level of
payment will represent a large proportion of earnings for the low paid, hence
producing the pattern for contributions illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Average pension contribution by members of personal 
schemes as proportion of earnings, 1996/7
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Stakeholder pensions
The role of tax reliefs features little in the pensions Green Paper.
Nevertheless, two aspects of it’s proposals for Stakeholder pensions are
worth commenting on. First, the Green Paper proposes that, in place of
the current system where contributions cannot exceed a particular
proportion of an individual’s earnings, there should be a simple annual
limit of £3,600 on voluntary contributions to Stakeholder schemes.7
Second, the Green Paper states that people will be able to move savings
between ISAs and Stakeholder schemes while still benefiting from tax
relief. As the below sets out, both of these changes may have more far-
reaching consequences than was perhaps envisaged.
Before looking at the effect of the government’s proposed cap on
contributions to Stakeholder schemes, it is worth setting out in detail
how the current system for limiting pension contributions works.
Everyone changing jobs or entering the labour market after 1989 is
subject to an annual limit on the amount which they may contribute to a
pension scheme tax-free. Employee contributions to occupational
                                          
7 The Green Paper in fact proposes that contributions to Stakeholder schemes
will “be limited to a fixed sum of £3,600 a year, or 100% of the member’s earnings,
whichever is the lower” (p.62). It is difficult to see why this second condition
was added, and it is ignored in the following.
Figure 5: Average pension contribution by members of 
occupational schemes as a proportion of earnings, 19996/7
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schemes may not exceed 15% of earnings while more generous limits,
varying with age, apply to personal pensions (up to age 35 tax-free
contributions are limited to 17.5% of salary, but this rises to 40% for the
over 60s). In addition, an ‘earnings cap’ of £87,600 (for the 1998/9 tax
year) is applied to both types of scheme: that is, the earnings figure to
which the relevant contribution percentage is applied cannot exceed
£87,600, thus setting an overall limit on the amount which can be
contributed tax-free. Employer contributions are included within the
limits applied to personal pensions, but there is no limit on employer
contributions to occupational schemes (though the benefits which such
schemes may produce are restricted).
As can be seen, the limit of £3,600 on contributions to Stakeholder
schemes is considerably lower than the existing earnings ceiling, at least
for higher earners. Indeed, it is likely that the majority of people earning
more than £30,000 will find the proposed limit constricts their saving
behaviour. However, as the Green Paper makes clear, the new type of
scheme is intended to supplement existing pension vehicles and, in
particular, it makes no mention of any changes to the current tax and
regulatory regime surrounding personal pensions. People will therefore
be free to choose the pension which best suits their needs, and hence we
might expect most high earners to continue to use personal pension
arrangements even after Stakeholder schemes are introduced. The
rationale for, in effect, denying high earners access to the new type of
scheme is somewhat unclear.
Perhaps more worryingly, however, the existence of higher
contribution limits on personal and occupational schemes would create
rather strange incentives to switch provision at particular points in the
lifecycle. For instance, someone earning £25,000 who decides to increase
their voluntary pension contributions from 10 to 15% of earnings would
find that, in order to build up the desired level of pension entitlements,
they had to switch out of a Stakeholder scheme into a personal pension.
Similarly, someone receiving employer pension payments of 10% of
salary would find that a pay increase from £35,000 to £40,000 would
force them to supplement their Stakeholder pension with a personal
pension. It is difficult to see any arguments in favour of such arbitrary
incentives to move from one type of scheme to another.
Notwithstanding the equity argument for applying the same
contribution cap to all types of pension arrangement, the practical
difficulties in implementing one rule for Stakeholder pensions and
another for personal and occupational schemes therefore makes some
change from the position taken in the Green Paper more or less
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inevitable. One possibility would, of course, be to retain the existing tax
relief rules for Stakeholder as well as personal and occupational
schemes. However, the current rules are rather complex and involve
checking contributions against earnings, thus adding to administration
costs. Given that Stakeholder pensions are intended to reduce
unnecessary costs, thus improving value-for-money for contributors,
this would be a move in the wrong direction.
A more attractive alternative would therefore be to abandon the
current system entirely and apply the £3,600 limit, with no relation to
earnings, to all types of pension scheme. Assuming low earners do not
increase their contributions, this would save around £500 million a year,
which might then be used to provide a higher level of relief on all
pension contributions. I calculate that the additional revenue resulting
from the imposition of a cap of £3,600 on all voluntary pension
contributions, plus partially restricting relief for higher rate taxpayers,
would allow a uniform rate of relief of 33% to be imposed.8 If the tax-
free lump sum were also retained this rate of relief would be sufficient to
ensure that pensions remained more tax advantaged than ISAs even for
people expecting to pay higher rate tax in retirement.9
The introduction of a uniform rate of relief on pension
contributions is particularly relevant given the Green Paper’s aim to
allow people “to transfer money from ISAs into Stakeholder pension schemes
both when they are in and out of work, with tax relief” (p63). This objective
will only be possible if there is a single rate of relief on all pension
contributions as, if there are different rates of relief for different
taxpayers, it would be necessary to trace back the origin of money paid
into an ISA to see what rate of relief should be applied to the money
being transferred into a pension. This is an administrative impossibility.
Hence not only does the Green Paper make it possible to finance a
                                          
8  Equivalently, tax relief could be abolished and a system of matching grants
introduced in its place, with each £ of pension contribution attracting 50p of
matching grant from the Exchequer. The arguments in favour of substituting
matching grants for tax reliefs are set out in detail in Agulnik and Le Grand
(1998).
9 Assuming that the tax-free lump sum accounts for 25% of an individual’s
pension, the effect of this additional tax exemption is to reduce higher rate
payers’ effective rate of tax on pension benefits to 30% (40%*.75). If pension
contributions receive relief at a rate of 33% there would therefore remain
some advantage, albeit reduced, in saving via a pension rather than via an
ISA.
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reasonably high uniform rate of relief (using savings from the
imposition of a £3,600 limit on all pension contributions), it also suggests
a link between ISAs and Stakeholder schemes which will be impossible
to operate while relief remains linked to individuals’ marginal tax rates.
Conclusion
The Green Paper may herald rather larger changes in pension tax reliefs
than, at first sight, it appears to suggest. The imposition of a £3,600 limit
on tax-free contributions to Stakeholder pensions but not on
contributions to other types of pension is anomalous and, in all
probability, unworkable. One solution to this would be to simply apply
the existing tax rules to Stakeholder schemes. However, as this paper
has demonstrated, the current system predominantly benefits the better-
off, hence such a change would be regressive. Relaxing the rules
surrounding Stakeholder pensions would therefore be a mistake –
imposing the £3,600 cap on all pension contributions and using this
money to increase the rate of relief provided on all contributions (or an
initial tranche of contributions) would be preferable. Indeed, reversing
tax relief rates – so that the initial tranche of contributions receives relief
at a higher rate than subsequent contributions – might fit in well with
the government’s strategy of ‘redistribution by stealth’.
However, an even more progressive option would be to reduce the
cost of tax reliefs dramatically and use the additional revenue to directly
increase the incomes of the poorest. This was the solution to the
‘pensions problem’ suggested by Richard Titmuss (1958). He suggested
that fiscal welfare (as he termed tax reliefs) should be cut back, thus
allowing a much larger Exchequer grant to be paid to the National
Insurance Fund, and hence allowing the level of universal flat-rate
pension benefits to rise (from which the poor would gain most
proportionately). This option remains open to the government. Large
amounts of additional revenue (though not as much as the gross figure
of £12bn) could be brought in by restricting tax relief on pension
contributions to the basic rate, phasing-out the tax-free lump sum,
treating pension contributions as a benefit-in-kind for the purposes of
calculating NICs, and abolishing tax relief on contacted-out rebates (so
that they receive the same tax treatment as contributions to SERPS or the
proposed State Second Pension). Using this money partly to pay off the
national debt and partly to finance increases in the basic pension would
be a sustainable alternative to the Green Paper’s strategy.
67
References
Agulnik, P. and Le Grand, J. (1998), ‘Tax Relief and Partnership
Pensions’, Fiscal Studies, 19:4.
Dilnot, A. and Johnson, P. (1993), ‘Tax Expenditures: The case of
occupational pensions’, Fiscal Studies, 14:1
Titmuss, R. (1958), ‘Pension Systems and Population Change’ in Essays
on the Welfare State. London: George Allen and Unwin.
